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Abstract 
 By 2025 the FAA plans to have fully implemented its NextGen Airspace design.  
NextGen takes advantage of modern positioning technologies as well as automation, data 
sharing, and display technologies that will allow more efficient use of our ever busier 
National Airspace (NAS).   A key element of NextGen is the transition from surveillance 
RADAR providing aircraft separation and navigation to the use of the GPS and 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B).  ADS-B couples the precision of 
the GPS with networked ground and airborne receivers to provide precise situational 
awareness to pilots and controllers.   The result is increased safety, capacity, and access 
with reduced reliance on an outdated and costly existing infrastructure.  Reliance on the 
vulnerable GPS requires a backup system with higher positioning accuracy than those 
that are in place today.  The USAF 746
th
 Test Squadron at Holloman AFB, in partnership 
with Locata Corp., has demonstrated an Ultra High Accuracy Reference System 
(UHARS) over the Holloman Range composed of pseudolites (ground based satellites) 
transmitting GPS like signals.  This study evaluates the suitability of the UHARS when 
applied on a national scale to meet Alternate Precision Navigation and Timing (APNT) 
requirements.  From a systems architecture perspective UHARS is evaluated against 
APNT CONOPs stated Operational Improvements and Scenarios.  From a signal 
architecture perspective the UHARS is evaluated against frequency and bandwidth 
constraints, service volume requirements and positioning accuracy determined by 
NextGen Airspace aircraft separation criteria.   
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PSEUDOLITE ARCHITECTURE AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
FOR THE FAA’S NextGen AIRSPACE 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
 By 2025 the FAA expects to have implemented many of its Next 
Generation (NextGen) improvements to the National Airspace (NAS).   NextGen 
Airspace boasts improvements to nearly every facet of the NAS, including efficiency, 
safety, situational awareness, environmental impact, and cost of service.   A key 
component of NextGen in 2025 is the transition from legacy navigation systems and 
RADAR surveillance to Alternate Precision Navigation and Timing (APNT) and 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) (Federal Aviation 
Administration 2012).    
Today’s NAS architecture dictates that Air Traffic Control (ATC) determines an 
aircraft’s position based on Surveillance RADAR returns.  The precision of this method 
degrades with increasing range from the RADAR site and is a factor in the minimum 
separation provided between aircraft for safety.  In a non-RADAR environment aircrew 
must report their position as determined from GPS or navigation aids such as VOR and 
DME.  This is known as procedural separation and it is the least accurate, therefore 
requiring the greatest separation between aircraft.   
The transition to ADS-B in NextGen architecture is dependent on precise 
aircraft reported position rather than surveillance or primary RADAR.  GPS is currently 
the only navigation source approved for ADS-B with the accuracy required to meet 
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NextGen performance objectives.  One of the primary objectives of NextGen is to 
increase capacity and access to our busiest airports.  Precise navigation and reduced 
separation in busy airspace (more aircraft flying efficiently through a smaller area) are 
the enablers. A secondary objective of dependent surveillance is a reduction in the 
required infrastructure and maintenance cost of the current NAS architecture.  This 
means removing non-essential and aging RADAR sites and navigation aids.   
Combined, the plans to reduce separation minimums and eliminate existing 
infrastructure place a heavy burden on the GPS service.  The safety of life concern and 
demand for high availability with few outages will require a backup to the vulnerable 
GPS.  This secondary navigation source is known as APNT. 
 The APNT CONOPS is our primary source of information regarding the 
necessary capabilities and functions of any APNT solution.  This CONOPS outlines 
multiple scenarios in which degraded or denied GPS will have significant impact on the 
safety, efficiency, and capacity of NextGen airspace in 2025. At best, user workload is 
increased and fuel or time savings from efficient routings is lost.  At worst, reduced 
separation minimums that were sufficient in the presence of GPS would place large 
numbers of aircraft dangerously close to one another around dozens of the nation’s 
busiest airports.  The ideal form of APNT would provide a seamless transition from 
GPS with no degradation in performance and unnoticed by the users.    
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Figure 1: APNT Architecture Alternatives 
 Three forms of APNT are being considered by the FAA and are depicted in 
Figure 1.  The first is an improvement of existing Distance Measuring Equipment 
(DME).  With DME, range from a known ground site is determined by timing a round 
trip signal sent from an aircraft to the ground site and back.  An “interrogation” is sent 
from the aircraft at a specific frequency in the form a pulse-pair.  If a ground site on the 
same frequency receives the pulse-pair it responds in kind after a specified delay.  The 
round trip time, plus the delay, is computed by the aircraft and converted to range.  
Given a range to two sites, and some knowledge of altitude, heading and airspeed, a 
“DME-DME” navigation system can determine an aircraft’s position.   DME ground 
sites have a limited capacity and can become saturated in busy airspace.  Current DME 
performance would not provide the accuracy or availability required by the APNT 
CONOPs.               
The second form of APNT being considered is Multi-Lateration (MLAT).  An 
aircraft’s position is determined again by measuring distances to multiple ground sites 
but the computation is done on the ground.  Ranging methods vary but each method 
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results in a unique range known to each ground site.  The range to each site is combined 
over a data network and used to compute a position in space.   The aircraft’s position is 
then sent via wireless data link to the aircraft.  MLAT already exists on the ground at 
busy airports to monitor busy traffic on ramps, taxiways, and runways (FAA 2007).  
One downside of MLAT is that information about range to an aircraft must be 
compared by multiple ground MLAT sites.  This requires network infrastructure and 
could theoretically be saturated.  A second downside is the increased risk to integrity as 
data passes through the network and position is transmitted to the aircraft.  
The third form of APNT being considered is a pseudolite architecture.         
Pseudo-satellites perform functions similar to those of Satellites of the GPS but exist on 
the ground as fixed transmitters.  The candidate technology that will be evaluated in 
this thesis, known as Locata, was developed on modified GPS hardware and resembles 
GPS signal architecture in several ways.  Each pseudolite transmits a unique signal that 
is synchronized to a common clock.  Avionics on the aircraft compare the time of 
reception of a signal to the time of transmission to compute range to the pseudolite.  
Computed range to multiple pseudolites is used to determine position.  Capacity of a  
pseudolite architecture is unlimited.   Integrity of the computed position is a composite 
of each of the signals used for the calculation.  Like GPS, a broken or false signal could 
be identified by the user autonomously, although at a cost.  A significant challenge of 
pseudolites is synchronization of their clocks on a continental scale.  Methods of 
synchronization will be explored further in this thesis.   
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The 746
th
 Test Squadron at Holloman Air Force Base has successfully 
demonstrated a pseudolite network known as the Ultra High Accuracy Reference 
System (UHARS) to accuracies that far exceed APNT requirements.  The purpose of 
the UHARS is to provide a reference system in the absence of GPS on the White Sands 
Missile Range accurate to 10 cm (Craig 2011).  It is based on the local area pseudolite 
technology known as Locata.   Locata signals are very similar to GPS signals in many 
regards.  Changes have been made to transmitted power levels, Time Domain Multiple 
Access (TDMA) schemes, and almanac information encoded in the signals to account 
for the terrestrial environment of the pseudolites compared to their GPS counterparts.   
Locata is billed as an alternative to GPS in environments that would deny the use of 
GPS such as inside warehouses or in deep urban canyons and open pit mines.  The 
UHARS demonstration is an adaptation of Locata that allows signal tracking up to 30 
nautical miles. In October 2011 ten pseudolites like the one depicted in Figure 2 were 
deployed over 800 square miles of the White Sands Range as a demonstration.   The 
operational UHARS will cover more than 2500 sq. miles (Craig 2011).   
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Figure 2: UHARS Pseudolite at White Sands 
The FAA APNT team has stated their desire to determine NextGen’s APNT 
source by 2015.  This study piece of the larger effort to determine what form of APNT 
will best serve our needs of 2025 and beyond. 
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Problem Statement 
How can the UHARS model of Locata pseudolite technology be applied to meet 
the APNT problem of NextGen 2025? 
 
The 746
th
 Test Squadron and Locata Corporation have together demonstrated 
that the UHARS can meet or exceed APNT accuracy requirements over a small area 
with good line-of-sight topography between pseudolites.  The APNT CONOPS 
demands a positioning source that is available over all of the Continental United States, 
(CONUS) at altitudes and through corridors used to access the nation’s busiest 135 
airports.   
Methodology and Research Objective 
 This thesis will consider the application of pseudolites to the APNT problem in 
two distinct phases.  The first phase will develop Systems Engineering architecture as a 
baseline that is modeled after the DoD Architecture Framework (DoD CIO 2010).  The 
architecture will describe a pseudolite navigation system in the context of the FAAs 
approved APNT CONOPs.  The focus of this architecture will be primarily on 
pseudolites, other organizations have been tasked with developing architecture for other 
alternatives such as DME/DME and MLAT techniques.  Viewpoints will be generated 
beginning with high level operational views that are consistent with existing 
documentation of NextGen 2025.  These views will, for the most part, be technology 
agnostic and could describe any pseudolite system in the context of the APNT 
CONOPS.   The primary objective of the operational viewpoints is to connect the 
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scenarios and operational improvements outlined in the APNT CONOPS with the 
theoretical capabilities of a pseudolite architecture.   
Systems views will then be developed that are more specific to the UHARS.  
Systems views will illustrate connectivity between nodes of the UHARS network and 
ultimately highlight the greatest challenge posed by a nationwide pseudolite network 
based off of UHARS.  The systems views will show the UHARS as it has been 
implemented at Holloman AFB and then be modified to show a potential variation of 
the UHARS that could satisfy the APNT need.     
An enterprise architecture exists for As-Is and To-Be NextGen airspace in an 
incomplete form.    The architecture focuses on how NextGen will function in the 
presence of GPS.  This study will highlight the strengths and shortcomings of a 
pseudolite solution in the context of the NextGen framework.    
 The second part of this thesis is a model of the UHARS signal that is designed 
to predict performance of a pseudolite system of varied configurations.  The model 
incorporates many characteristics of the UHARS signal as variables, applies basic 
models of signal propagation, hardware attenuation, and receiver performance to 
predict the positioning accuracy of the signal.  The model also considers signals that 
will potentially share the same band as the new APNT signal.  These signals reside in a 
protected band from 960 MHz to 1215 MHz known as the Airborne Radio Navigation 
Service (ARNS).  Each “resident” of the ARNS has its own published values of 
acceptable interference that must be considered.  Three primary characteristics of any 
signal become apparent.  The effective range of the signal will determine the number of 
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pseudolites required to cover the NAS and 135 busy airports.  The coded message 
within the signal will affect its theoretical accuracy and precision.  The combination of 
power and signal frequency and encoding will affect its influence on (and from) radios 
in nearby channels. 
 The objective of this signal model is to bound the trade space between 
positioning performance of the system, the potential cost of infrastructure required for 
nationwide coverage, and its ability to coexist with existing radio navigation systems.   
Investigative Questions 
 To meet the research objectives stated above, the following questions will be 
used as guidelines in the production of architectural viewpoints and building a model of 
pseudolite APNT.    
o What measures of performance will adequately define any APNT system 
within the context of NextGen2025? 
o What is the cost of increasing coverage within the continental US (CONUS) or 
providing an over-determined solution for integrity in terms of the number of 
pseudolites required? 
o How does the service volume of a pseudolite affect the number of pseudolites 
required to cover all airspace requiring APNT? 
o How will a pseudolite APNT signal operate within the ARNS band? 
o Can the UHARS meet the operational improvements of NextGen and scenario 
based CONOPS of APNT, what levels of performance will be required in any 
given airspace? 
o What are the shortfalls of the UHARS signal, pseudolite architecture, and 
APNT performance requirements when applied to NextGen 2025 operational 
improvements? 
o What is an acceptable means of clock synchronization?   
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Assumptions, Limitations and Scope 
This thesis is written in the context of NextGen 2025 improvements to the NAS.  
The focus is on pseudolite technology applied to the need for APNT.   The APNT 
CONOPs is the primary reference that defines the mission of APNT (Federal Aviation 
Administration 2012).  The pseudolite architecture proposed reflects the minimum 
“threshold” performance stated by the FAAs APNT team, as well as the desired level of 
performance.   
This thesis will not attempt to model the cost of any proposed pseudolite APNT 
solution.  It will provide a foundation upon which cost estimates could be developed in 
the future.  Answers to questions such as: ‘How many pseudolites will be required?’ 
and ‘What timing infrastructure will be needed?’, will be discussed in this thesis. 
This thesis will not evaluate the performance of a pseudolite signal outside of 
US airspace.  However, existing navigation sources in the ARNS band are protected by 
international treaty and any APNT solution would be equipped on aircraft that fly 
internationally.  Logically then, future research should include suitability in oceanic or 
foreign airspace. 
Key assumptions are as follows: 
 Aircraft operating in 2025 controlled airspace will be required to operate 
ADS-B equipment coupled to a suitable navigation source. 
 GPS outages may be caused by unexpected system failures, planned or 
predictable interference, or by malicious jamming and spoofing activity. 
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 At a minimum, APNT must provide means of safe navigation to a point 
clear of GPS outage or to an instrument landing system (ILS) final 
approach fix at one of the nation’s 65 busiest airports. 
In the development of the UHARS signal model many assumptions were made 
about the performance of receivers, masks and filters, and the stated properties of other 
ARNS navigation signals.  Signal propagation, range accuracy, and other error models 
are only rudimentary models.  Therefore, the signal model is limited to first order 
analysis of pseudolites and the UHARS as an APNT solution.  Future research should 
include high fidelity simulation or actual hardware implantation of a proposed APNT 
signal.  
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II. Literature Review 
The following review covers those documents and topics that were key to this 
thesis.  They each provide an important volume of background information required to 
develop the architecture and signal models that follow.  Minor documents not covered 
in this section are referenced throughout the text. 
Concept of Operations 
 The United States’ air transportation system is under increasing stress from user 
demands.  While accommodating increasing traffic it must also accommodate 
increasing environmental and security concerns.  The current system is probably not 
capable of meeting our demands beyond 2025.  In response the Joint Planning and 
Development Office has been tasked with defining the CONOPS for the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) (Joint Planning and Development 
Office 2010).   
NextGen boasts several improvements over today’s air transportation system.  
These improvements can be divided into services such as Air Traffic Management, 
Airport Operations, Net-Centric Infrastructure, and Safety Management.  
Communications and automation will play a big role in NextGen architecture, allowing 
service providers and customers to share information and respond accordingly, known 
as Shared Situational Awareness (SSA).   
Of note, NextGen must accommodate a predicted 100% increase in air traffic by 
2025.  While increasing capacity, there will always be a desire to reduce delays and 
interruptions, reduce operator workload, decrease environmental impact, and improve 
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safety.  NextGen addresses all of these issues by relying on modern enabling 
technologies that did not exist when the present air transportation system was designed.   
Increasing capacity, improving safety and efficiency, and reducing interruptions means 
squeezing more aircraft into the same airspace; this means higher precision means of 
navigation and surveillance.  The key enabling technology to increase traffic density 
was the Global Positioning System, other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) 
and ground systems collectively known as Precision Navigation and Timing (PNT).   
A transition to PNT and SSA will not only provide the benefits listed above but 
allow the FAA to eliminate costly legacy navigation and surveillance systems.   PNT 
alone allows aircraft operators to determine their position in time and space more 
precisely than with traditional VOR and DME equipment.  Through SSA, controllers 
on the ground are able to use PNT to support more precise surveillance of air traffic, 
thereby reducing traffic separation minimums and optimizing traffic flows.  This is 
known as dependent surveillance (surveillance depends upon aircraft reported position) 
and leads us to a common failure mode that had not existed in the past.  When PNT is 
lost, ATC surveillance capability is lost as well.  Current surveillance RADAR 
performance is not able to support NextGen standards.   
The APNT CONOPS provides a brief background of NextGen improvements 
and places the need for APNT into context.  The CONOPS describes the bona fide need 
for an alternate positioning source, builds two scenarios in which users of NextGen 
would require an APNT source, and then outlines the impacts of GPS interference on 
the NAS without an APNT source (Federal Aviation Administration 2012).    
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Because air transportation navigation and surveillance are “safety-of-life” 
operations, the reliance of both on PNT requires an alternate system be in place.   
National Policy directives mandate that the Department of Transportation and 
Department of Homeland Security work together to mitigate the threats posed to 
national infrastructure that could cause harm to citizens or disrupt economies as well as 
provide a backup to the GPS in case of a disruption (Federal Aviation Administration 
2012).   As stated above, current surveillance and navigation infrastructure could not 
serve as a backup because it lacks the precision.  As transition to NextGen progresses 
and reliance on PNT becomes greater the potential cost of a GPS outage grows.  With a 
backup in place, the value of GPS as a terrorist target would also be diminished.  
Accordingly, four pillars of APNT are outlined in the APNT CONOPS: 
 
 Safe recovery (landing) of aircraft flying in Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC) under Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) operations 
 Strategic modification of flight trajectories to avoid areas of interference and 
manage demand within the interference area  
 Continued dispatch of air carrier operations to deny an economic target for an 
intentional jammer 
 Flight operations continue without a significant increase in workload for either the 
pilot or the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) during an interference event.  
 
The two scenarios developed in the APNT CONOPS describe a commercial 
carrier and a general aviation aircraft conducting long range flights into Bozeman, MT 
and Miami, FL.  At each stage of flight, from pre-flight planning to post-flight shut 
down at the terminal, the operational impacts of a GPS outage in the absence of an 
APNT source are highlighted.   The impacts of a GPS outage and the response by ATC 
and operators will vary depending on the nature of the outage.  Many forms of GPS 
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outage or interference are described and can be categorized by a few variables.  Is the 
outage planned, can it be predicted, or is it unpredictable?  Is the outage localized or 
wide spread?  Is the outage intermittent or continuous?   Realistic GPS interference 
scenarios are presented in two forms.   “Personal privacy devices” are localized, 
intermittent, and unpredictable.  These are low powered noise jammers often used to 
disable tracking devices on vehicles.  Intentional GPS jamming for National Security 
can be widespread but is planned and predictable.   Intentional interference with GPS 
by the DOD is often necessary for the development of advanced navigation 
technologies. 
Finally, the APNT CONOPS references positioning performance standards for 
various types of airspace and phases of flight and defines “APNT Zones” that would be 
used to define required performance levels of any APNT signal within each Zone.  This 
thesis will reduce the performance criteria to the basic performance standards of APNT 
and identify which Operational Improvements will be met by a pseudolite APNT 
system. 
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Locata Pseudolites 
 Locata technology provides the basis for the pseudolite model being studied in 
this thesis.  Locata was developed for commercial use by an Australian company to 
provide a PNT source in environments that would preclude the use of GPS.   Such 
environments include open pit mining, urban canyons, warehouses, or in other 
buildings with poor GPS signal.  To simplify the development process, the Locata 
positioning signal was modeled after the GPS and then modified to meet the unique 
requirements of a terrestrial positioning system (Locata Corporation 2011).  
 A LocataNet is built from multiple ground based pseudolites, each referred to as 
LocataLites, which make up the Terestrial Segment (TS), and a limitless number of 
user receivers known as the User Segment (US).  There is no distinct control segment 
as with the GPS.  Establishing the TS involves surveying each LocataLite position.   
Because the LocataLites are in a fixed position no control segment is required to 
monitor the position of the LocataLites.   LocataLites autonomously arrange themselves 
into the appropriate network patterns based on available line-of-site geometry over the 
network area.  This line-of-site link between LocataLites became one of its primary 
limitations when applied to nationwide APNT. 
 As a pseudolite positioning system, Locata uses multiple ranging signals from 
known points to determine a user’s position in space.  Most readers will be at least 
partly familiar with this method of positioning used by the GPS.  The primary 
difference between GPS, or other global navigation satellite system (GNSS), and 
Locata is that the ranging signals are sent from ground based “pseudo satellites” rather 
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than space based satellites.  The timing of the ranging signals from each pseudolite is 
predefined.  Through the use of pseudorandom spreading codes, much like the GPS, 
this time of transmission is compared to the time of reception at the user’s receiver to 
determine the distance the signal has traveled.  This process does not require a precise 
clock in the user’s receiver but does require coordinated time references at each of the 
pseudolites.  GPS takes advantage of precise clocks and correction updates from the 
GPS control segment.  LocataNets use a proprietary process known as TimeLoc. 
 TimeLoc is a method of referencing each LocataLite’s internal clock to a master 
LocataLite.   The master LocataLite’s time reference may be its own internal clock, or 
more precise references derived externally.  This eliminates the need to include clock 
correction information in the ephemeris data of the signal.  To synchronize a slave to 
the master, the slave LocataLite “listens” to its own transmitted signal and matches it, 
in phase, to the received signal from the master LocataLite.  A single “hop” is said to be 
accurate to 6 cycles, 2 nano-seconds, or 60 centimeters (Locata Corporation 2011).  
TimeLoc can then be cascaded such that a slave LocataLite is a master to a third 
LocataLite beyond line-of-site from the original master.  This method of time 
synchronization is precise and low cost but requires a clear line-of-site from one 
LocataLite to another. 
 Satellites in the GPS constellation are over 20,000km away, with a variation of 
only a few thousand kilometers.  Terrestrial pseudolites of LocataNets may range from 
tens of kilometers to only a few meters.  The resulting variation in signal strength can 
easily exceed the dynamic range of Locata receivers derived from the pseudorandom 
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spreading codes’ code division multiple access (CDMA).   The solution is to include a 
TDMA scheme, on top of the CDMA, into the Locata signal.  Each LocataLite is 
assigned a position on a sub-net that allows it to broadcast only 100msec of each 
second.  This prevents interference between LocataLites that may be near and far.   The 
TDMA scheme will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 4.   
 To allow an elegant combination of GPS and Locata hardware, Locata designers 
built upon the GPS frequency plan.  The pseudorandom codes of each LocataLite are 
the same codes used by GPS, although “chipped” at a ten-times faster rate to improve 
ranging precision and spread the signal over a wider bandwidth.  The base oscillator 
frequency is the same, although Locata transmits in the license-free 2.4GHz ISM band.  
Modifications in this thesis will attempt to keep these similarities intact. 
 To mitigate multi-path interference, and enable “wide-lane” carrier phase 
techniques, each LocataLite transmits two similar signals on different frequencies 
(Locata Corporation 2011).  Antenna spatial diversity can also be implemented at a 
LocataLite to mitigate multi-path.  Transmission of two signals from two physically 
separated antennas requires four unique signals from each LocataLite.  These 
techniques of multipath mitigation are important in the typical Locata installation 
indoors, in open mines, and in urban areas.  These crowded spaces offer many 
opportunities for signals to reflect off of objects.   
Ultra High Accuracy Reference System 
 The Air Force’s 746
th
 Test Squadron, based at Holloman AFB, NM, is the 
Department of Defense’s lead test organization for GPS user equipment and other 
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navigation references systems.  To evaluate the performance of user equipment in the 
presence of GPS interference, or to develop new technologies capable of meeting user 
navigational needs in the absence of GPS, the 746
th
 required a non-GPS based 
positioning system (NGBPS).  This precise NGBPS would be used as a “truth” 
reference in the course of test and evaluation over the White Sands Missile Range and 
is referred to as the Ultra High Accuracy Reference System (UHARS). 
 The 746
th
 Test Squadron chose to adapt Locata technology to meet its UHARS 
requirements based on Locata’s demonstrated successes (Craig 2011).  Prior to 2010 
Locata had been successfully demonstrated for commercial application in mining and 
indoor warehouse automation to centimeter level accuracy (Barnes 2005).  The 
UHARS would require performance over much wider areas, tracking maneuvering 
aircraft at over 500km/hr.  Locata was contracted to update their technology and 
demonstrate the following enhancements: 
 Locata Receivers must acquire and track signals at a minimum range of 30 miles 
 Nanosecond level “TimeLoc” synchronization of LocataLites at these ranges  
 Transmit Locata signals at higher power via external amplifier while maintaining signal 
and TimeLoc integrity 
 Design and  apply  transmitter and receiver antennas to provide adequate gain and 
multipath mitigation under aircraft dynamics 
 Demonstrate adequate receiver tracking loop performance under aircraft dynamics 
 Develop tropospheric models that mitigate large errors experienced by  terrestrial 
signals propagated over long ranges 
 Ensure post-processed accuracy better than 18cm 3D-RMS (PDOP<3) at long range 
 
To meet these challenges Locata focused on four key enhancements.  First, the 
range of each LocataLite signal had to be increased from approximately 10km to over 
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50km.  A suitable external amplifier was chosen to increase transmitted power from 
100 milliwatts to 10 watts.  Second, to achieve a 3D solution at altitude, antennas with 
suitable gain patterns had to be developed to reach LocataLites directly below aircraft 
as well as near the horizon.  Third, the LocataLite receivers had to demonstrate the 
ability to track signals from banking and maneuvering aircraft.  The expected range and 
acceleration rates had to be simulated on the ground and tracked prior to demonstration 
at White Sands.  Fourth, the errors induced by propagating a signal through 30 miles of 
the troposphere had to be appropriately modeled and removed.   Through accurate 
modeling, and metrological data gathering in real time this error was reduced from 
approximately 280 parts per million (about 13.5 meters at 30 miles) to only a few parts 
per million, or 4.5 centimeters. 
In October of 2011, a scaled UHARS was demonstrated on the White Sands Missile 
Range in an area of approximately 35km by 30km.   The network, shown in Figure 3, 
was made up of ten LocataLites synchronized via TimeLoc hops of up to 7 miles.  The 
primary master LocataLite was positioned on a mountain top which provided a clear 
line-of-sight to all but one of the LocataLites.   This stranded LocataLite was 
successfully included in the network via a single “hop” to the master.  Throughout 
testing, the UHARS network was able to maintain nano-second level timing 
synchronization after approximately 30 seconds of initialization time.  During the 
demonstration an Air Force C-12 was flown with a Locata receiver as well as a GPS 
receiver and inertial reference unit to collect truth data for post processing.  
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Figure 3: UHARS Pseudolote Network 
Transmitting at 10 watts allowed the test aircraft to acquire the UHARS signal at a 
range of 62km.   Once acquired, signals were tracked at a range of 66km.  Recall, the 
746
th
’s minimum range to acquire and track was 48km.  During the flight test data was 
collected in a race track pattern at 195kts, 25,000ft above sea level.   Range to a typical 
LocataLite varied from approximately 25km to 35km during the bulk of the test.  This 
provided received signal strength from approximately -95dBm to -100dBm.  These 
values will be used as a reference when predicting performance of an APNT system 
built on a national scale.  
The data gathered during flight testing showed that the UHARS system met the 
746
th
 Test Squadrons accuracy requirements.  Tracking all 10 LocataLites, the 
Positional-Dilution of Precision (PDOP) averaged 2.35, with a worst case of 3.  The 
vertical dilution was the largest contributor to DOP at an average of 2.06.  Given a 
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PDOP of less than 3, the 746
th
 required a positioning accuracy of 18cm or better.   The 
Locata UHARS system was able to demonstrate a carrier solution RMS accuracy of 
17.4cm.  A more robust code based solution provided 24.5cm 3 dimensional RMS 
accuracy.   
Based on its performance when applied to the UHARS, Locata technology could be 
a good candidate for a nationwide APNT system.  This thesis will evaluate how a 
pseudolite system meets NextGen APNT requirements from an operational standpoint 
and it will also evaluate how the UHARS could be modified to meet performance 
requirements.  The primary challenge of adapting the UHARS to APNT is scale.   
 
ADS-B 
 Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) is one of the primary 
improvements in NextGen architecture.  ADS-B will allow the FAA to transition the air 
traffic control system from primarily using ground based RADAR to primarily using 
precise positioning sources such as Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) enabled 
GPS.  NAS surveillance will be “dependent” upon aircraft reported position by 2025.  
The transition to ADS-B has many operational benefits, including decreased separation 
minimums between aircraft, air-to-air surveillance for increased safety and awareness, 
and more efficient use of resources as legacy surveillance and navigation infrastructure 
is decommissioned.   
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 All aircraft operating in controller airspace are required to transmit an ADS-B 
Out signal prior to 2020. (Federal Aviation Administration 2010).  This ADS-B out 
signal has many components but consists primarily of the aircrafts position, altitude, 
and velocity information, as well as unique aircraft identification information.  The 
ADS-B Out messages broadcast from nearly every aircraft in the NAS are received by 
Ground Based Transceivers (GBT) and combined to build a picture of airborne traffic.  
This information is then delivered to air traffic controllers and re-broadcast to aircraft 
equipped with ADS-B In equipment.  In this fashion, both aircrew and air traffic 
controllers will have the same, precise, near real time situational picture of the NAS.  
ADS-B In is not yet a requirement at any point in the future, therefore, aircraft without 
this capability will rely on visual separation and ATC guidance for separation.  
 ADS-B Out messages will be transmitted on one (or both) of two signals.  
Above 18,000’ MSL, all aircraft must transmit on what is known as “1090 Extended 
Squitter”.  1090ES is a 1Mbps message encoded on a 1090 MHz carrier wave (Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics, SC-186 2006).   Below 18,000’ MSL aircraft 
operators will have the option to transmit ADS-B Out through a Universal Access 
Transceiver (UAT) in 1Mbps messages encoded on 978 MHz carrier channel (Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics, SC-186 2009) s.  The ADS-B Out information 
is received by ATC on the ground or by ADS-B In and TCAS equipped aircraft in the 
air.  What is important to note, again, is that in the absence of surveillance RADAR and 
in congested airspace, surveillance relies on precise position information broadcast via 
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ADS-B.  The dissemination of surveillance information via ADS-B In and ADS-
Rebroadcast (ADS-R) is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
ARNS Band Users 
 A constraint placed on any potential APNT system is that it must operate within 
the Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service (ARNS) band.  This band spans from 960 
MHz to 1215 MHz and is protected not only by the FCC but by international treaty 
(CFR Title 47, Part 87 2012).  Although the band is ideal for an APNT signal because 
of the protection and monitoring it is afforded, it is a very “crowded” band.  The 
systems that currently utilize channels within the band span from end to end, some on 
hundreds of narrow channels,   others on a single wide-band channel. 
 As mentioned above, ADS-B Out information will be transmitted via the UAT.  
UATs will also be used to transmit and receive Traffic Information Service (TIS-B), 
and Flight Information Service (FIS-B).  Delivering this information to the cockpit is a 
major enabling capability of NextGen operational improvements.  TIS-B and FIS-B are 
means of delivering information about nearby aircraft, and flight planning information 
such as airspace restrictions, hazardous weather reports, and weather imagery. 
The UAT signal is centered on 978 MHz and modulated using continuous 
phase, frequency shift keying (CPFSK).  Because the UATs will be numerous and 
channel saturation is a potential hazard, the signal is “spread” using a Time Domain 
Multiple Access technique.  This TDMA scheme minimizes the effect of UAT signals 
on adjacent channels while allowing many simultaneous co-channel operators.  The 
UAT TDMA frame is one second long.  Ground stations will be assigned fixed message 
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start opportunities (MSOs) within the first 176 msec of each frame.  Airborne UATs 
transmit on pseudo randomly varying MSOs within the latter 800 msec of each frame.  
This ensures that no ground UATs will interfere with another ground UAT, and 
airborne interference will be intermittent and unlikely to occur in consecutive frames 
(Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, SC-186 2009). 
 Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) is used to determine range from fixed 
ground stations.  Airborne transceivers “interrogate” the ground station on a channel 
unique to that ground station.  The ground station replies on an associated, but offset by 
63 MHz, channel after a brief delay.  The time required to receive the reply at the 
aircraft is used to determine range.  The interrogation and reply signals are made up of 
brief pulses spaced at fixed intervals.  This intermittent nature of the signal has allowed 
other ARNS systems to use the same frequencies as DME on a non-interference basis.  
DME occupies narrow channels spaced at 1 MHz from 962 MHz to 1215 MHz (FAA 
1984).  A few of these channels are in limited use because of their proximity to other 
ARNS signals or their application, as in the case of mobile TACAN (MILSTD-291C 
1998). 
 DME signals are often associated with other navigation signals such as 
TACAN, VOR, and ILS (CFR Title 47, Part 87 2012).  The channel pairings between 
DME interrogation, DME reply and these associated systems are often fixed and 
published.   Therefore, if an APNT source might interfere with these DME channels, 
consideration must be given to the effects on the associated systems.  This will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.   
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 The Air Traffic Control RADAR Beacon Service (ATCRBS) occupies two wide 
bands of the ARNS band.  The ATCRBS is the only means of surveillance today, and 
although a few transmitters will be decommissioned as ADS-B becomes operational, 
this band is not likely to become available anytime soon.  Ground based surveillance 
RADAR and transponder interrogation signals are transmitted at 1030 MHz.  The reply 
signals from airborne transponders are centered on 1090 MHz.  These signals are high 
powered and may carry modulated data at rates of up to 1 Mbps (RTCA 2008).  For this 
reason DME and TACAN channels within approximately 10 MHz of 1030 MHz or 
1090 MHz are not in common usage.  Other ARNS systems have made similar 
compromises to avoid interference with the ATCRBS. 
 The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) is, as the name 
suggests, a data-link used in the United States and by our allies for military purposes.  
The JTIDS signal allows secure communication between many types of vehicles and 
hand held devices.  The JTIDS signal was placed in the ARNS band on a non-
interference basis.   To meet this requirement the JTIDS uses a TDMA scheme to 
spread its energy over the ARNS band. 
 The JTIDS occupies 51 channels between 969 MHz and 1206 MHz.  The 
channels are spaced approximately 3 MHz apart and there are notable gaps from 1008-
1053 MHz and 1065-1113 MHz.  These gaps prevent interference with ATCRBS.  The 
TDMA architecture provides message start opportunities spaced approximately 8 msec 
apart.  The low duty cycle and message pulse signature prevents interference with any 
particular DME or TACAN channel (DoD 2012).   
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 As part of its GPS modernization effort, the DOD has added an additional 
navigation signal to newer GPS satellites.  The signal, referred to as L5, is an open 
signal for civilian use in the ARNS band.  It is intended to be a more reliable signal and 
add redundancy for use in safety of life applications.  The first satellite to broadcast an 
L5 signal was launched in 2010.  This L5 signal is centered on 1176 MHz and is 
modulated similarly to the GPS L1 and L2 signals, although at a much faster chipping 
rate.  The 10.23 MHz chipping rate spreads the L5 signal over approximately 20 MHz 
(GPS Directorate 2011).  Because the energy of the signal is spread over a wide band, 
is modulated by binary phase shift keying (BPSK), and is received at low power levels 
by the user, it is able to share the ARNS band with multiple DME and TACAN 
channels. 
 The European Space Agency is currently launching its own form of GNSS, 
known as Galileo.   By the end of 2013, six of thirty planned satellites will have been 
launched.   Each current Galileo satellite will broadcast several navigation signals, the 
E5 signal will reside in the ARNS band.   The E5 signal is modulated using CDM like 
the GPS but is modulated using an Alternative Binary Offset Carrier scheme.  This 
method results in what is effectively two adjacent 20MHz wide signals centered on 
1176 MHz and 1207 MHz (European Union 2010).  Although this may be an 
oversimplification for many applications, it will suffice here. 
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Precise Timing 
 Precise time synchronization is critical to any pseudolite or MLAT type APNT 
solution.  The relative synchronization of all the network nodes is directly related to the 
ranging and positioning precision of the system.  The internal time reference that is 
used may be from any source, so long as each node follows the same reference.  In the 
case of Locata and the UHARS, this time reference may be GPS time or the internal 
quartz oscillator of the master LocataLite (Locata Corporation 2011).  Without a robust 
and precise method of synchronizing nodes, each node must be capable of maintaining 
accurate time on its own. 
To maintain the required positioning accuracy of an APNT system, timing 
errors can be converted to range errors.   Based on Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP) and surveillance accuracy requirements in NextGen airspace an APNT system 
will have to provide a positioning accuracy of 92.6m.  Accounting for geometric DOP 
and estimated ranging accuracy of the APNT source, any time synchronization would 
have to be accurate to approximately 50 ns, or about 15 meters (Lo, Akos and Dennis, 
Time Source Options for Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 2012). 
Achieving this level of accuracy over an area the size of the United States fortunately is 
not necessary.  Nationwide reference to UTC within 20 seconds is sufficient to meet 
APNT and RNAV performance requirements (Reference chapter IV).  Fortunately, 
nanosecond relative time synchronization is only necessary between those pseudolites 
in view of a single receiver and used for a position solution. 
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Synchronizing clocks can be broken into three components.    First, the accuracy 
of the reference must be adequate.  For flexibility and integration into other systems 
UTC may be used as a reference time standard.  Space based references such as GPS 
and WAAS may achieve 15-30 ns accuracy.   Second, a means of distributing precise 
updates to each node of the network must exit.  Updates may be transmitted wirelessly 
from terrestrial sources, space based sources; or transmitted terrestrially via fiber or 
cable.  Updates must be frequent enough to accommodate the drift rate of each node’s 
internal clock.  Third, an accurate frequency reference must be present at each node.  
The reference must be accurate enough to “drift” until the next synchronization update 
occurs or used as a hold over during interference and outages (Lo, Akos and Dennis, 
Time Source Options for Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 2012).   
Terrestrial, wireless distribution of an accurate time reference depends on the 
availability of line-of-site between pseudolites.  Over flat terrain, each pseudolite in a 
UHARS type system would require a 400ft tall tower to synchronize clocks 50nmi 
apart due to the curvature of the Earth.  This is not only impractical but the accuracy of 
the reference would degrade by 2 ns with each “hop” (Locata Corporation 2011).   
Terrestrial hard-wired connections would likely require a dedicated fiber to each 
pseudolite and may degrade by 5ns with each hop.  Space based wide area 
synchronization is currently the only method practically available and capable of the 
precision required by APNT.  Space based time synchronization is both practical and 
accurate but is vulnerable to interference and has common failure modes to the very 
navigation systems APNT is designed to backup. 
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As an alternative to the GPS, an APNT system must be able to tolerate 
reasonable interference and outages of the GPS.  A precise frequency reference at each 
pseudolite, such as a Rubidium Oscillator, may be used to “coast” through a GPS 
outage for up to 12hrs at a cost of less than $1500 per clock (Lo, Akos and Dennis 
2012).  This would mitigate the effects powerful jammers or GPS outages unrelated to 
jamming.  To provide robustness to jamming a pseudolite may use several techniques.  
In a 2010 paper to the FAA on timing sources, Lo, Akos, and Dennis describe 
controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA) that may provide 20-40dB of suppression 
to terrestrial jammers.  The GPS now transmits civil navigation signals on three 
frequencies, requiring jammers to spread their power over a broad spectrum.  The 
higher power and architecture of newer GPS signals provides up to 15dB of resistance 
over older signals.  Resistance to jamming provided by CRPA antennas, GPS 
modernization, and improved receiver design would likely prevent any wide denial of 
service to a space based time reference.  An APNT network could be designed then, to 
accommodate localized outages of up to 12 hours with current technology.  
Time Distribution 
 Locata’s technique of time synchronization is one of its distinguishing 
characteristics from other forms of pseudolites.   Through the process referred to as 
TimeLoc, each pseudolite adjusts the transmission time of its own signal to match the 
transmission time of a master pseudolite’s ranging signal.  The signals are matched in 
phase but with up to six cycles of ambiguity (Locata Corporation 2011).  For a 
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pseudolite to use TimeLoc, it must be able to receive the ranging signal of the master 
just as any user receiver would: via line-of-sight radio link. 
 The current architecture of Locata dictates that each pseudolite attempt to slave 
it’s signal to a master.  If the master is not in sight, the pseudolite will synchronize its 
clock to another pseudolite that is in view of the master.  The pseudolites are then 
“daisy-chained” together and time distribution is cascaded beyond line-of-sight from 
the original master LocataLite.  Distributing time via line-of-sight on a continental scale 
is almost certainly cost prohibitive because of the number of pseudolites that would be 
required.  Accuracy of TimeLoc degrades with each step in the cascade as well.   It 
should be noted here that this degradation is not cumulative, but only significant to the 
user in relative terms.  Pseudolites on the east coast may be a full second off of 
pseudolites on the west coast if TimeLoc were cascaded across the country.  The 
relative accuracy of each pseudolite in view of the receiver will determine position 
error due to clock error.      
 TimeLoc does provide a potentially valuable solution to robust time 
distribution.  While cascaded TimeLoc on a continental scale is not likely, TimeLoc on 
a local scale could provide a backup to space based time distribution or help to improve 
the accuracy of a local network.  Localized TimeLoc would rely on space based time 
distribution as a reference at the master LocataLite.  The master would then distribute 
time via TimeLoc to all pseudolites in view.  Cities such as Denver and Salt Lake City 
provide ideal geometry for this method.  A master LocataLite placed high on the 
horizon could be in view of all pseudolites placed around the airport on lower, flat 
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terrain.  Each pseudolite could reference GPS time as an integrity check when 
available.  LocataLite firmware could also be designed to autonomously restructure the 
LocataNet to designate any pseudolite with a strong GPS signal as the local master.   
This flexibility may protect against mobile GPS interference presented by personal 
privacy jammers.   
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III. Operational Architecture 
 To gain a fuller understanding of APNT and NextGen, a Systems Engineering 
approach was taken.  Using the DoD Architecture Framework, Use Cases and a series 
of Operational Viewpoints (OVs) were first created.  Part of the FAA’s desired 
outcome for this research was to use Systems Engineering methods to determine if the 
UHARS could serve as a suitable APNT source.  This portion of the architecture 
development takes a step back and will analyze the suitability of APNT performance 
requirements, as stated by the APNT team and within the APNT CONOPs, for meeting 
NextGen Operational Improvements.  The architecture allows for a traceable 
connection from the Operational Improvements promised by NextGen at the enterprise 
level, to scenario based Use Cases and Operational Activities, finally to specific 
attributes and measures of any APNT system.  Chapter IV will cover the System Views 
(SVs) in detail and specifically cover performance of the UHARS when applied to 
APNT 
Use Cases and Operational Activities 
 The APNT CONOPS describes two unique scenarios that involve operations 
within NextGen airspace.  The scenarios allow the reader to walk through every phase 
of flight, from pre-flight planning, to post-flight parking, and witness the interaction 
between the users and the NAS.  The scenarios read like a narrative of each flight, with 
occasional interruptions to describe what would occur if GPS service (which NextGen 
operations will depend on for critical functions) were interrupted, expectedly or not.  
Between the two scenarios every phase of flight is covered and the associated functions 
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of APNT are encountered.  There are seven areas of emphasis in the scenarios that 
roughly fall into two categories.  The first category involves collaborative (airlines, 
aircrew, and the ANSP) management of the airspace and information sharing.  These 
areas are indirectly dependent on precision navigation and are not considered here.   
The second category involves 4D trajectory (4DT) management, aircraft separation, 
and increased flexibility of en-route and airport operations.  An evolution of the routing 
in today’s flight plans, 4DTs define the flight path in space and time that an aircraft is 
planned to follow.  There are three areas of emphasis that were considered to build the 
Operational Activity Diagram in Figure 4: 
 
 Trajectory Management – the process of defining and flying a 4DT that considers 
capacity, flow contingencies and many other performance-based factors, known as 
Trajectory Based Operations (TBO)  
 Separation Management – the processes and procedures used to safely separate 
aircraft both on the airport surface and in the air  
 Flexible Airports and Surface Operations – where procedures and tools are 
available to improve throughput, surface movement, and environmental 
performance. These areas of emphasis are directly enabled by precision area 
navigation.   
 
The initial direction for architecture product development was to create a list of use 
cases from scenarios in the CONOPs.  What soon emerged was a set of use cases in 
which the underlying activities were all common.  A scheduled airline flight that 
wished to follow a 4DT ultimately must use the same methods and sources of 
navigation as a private flight.  An air traffic controller will use the same tools to 
manage traffic approaching a busy airport as they would to provide flexible routing 
around a storm.  After several iterations; a Use Case Diagram was developed to provide 
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a graphic relationship of the Operational Activities related to positioning in NextGen 
airspace.   
Figure 4 is a representation of the relationships between users, service providers, 
and the Activities derived from Operational Scenarios.  The primary actors that will 
interact in NextGen operations are depicted on the left.  The three primary actors are 
the Aircrew who operate the aircraft, Flight Operations who are responsible for flight 
planning and scheduling, and the ANSP who will work with both to ensure efficient, 
effective, and safe routing of aircraft.  The actors on the right are service providers of 
enabling systems.  In the center are the various activities directly related to position and 
timing.   The top left corner of the diagrams lists aircraft “states” which will be 
discussed later in the chapter.  Each activity in the diagram may occur during any phase 
of flight or aircraft state.  The aircraft state, combined with the activity, will determine 
the performance required from APNT. 
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Figure 4: Operational Activity Model 
 
 What can be derived from this diagram is that all paths ultimately lead to 
determining an aircraft’s position and time.   Testing the system by introducing GPS 
interference, as is done in the CONOPs scenarios, reveals loss of service that 
significantly impacts smooth, safe operations of the NAS.  As the FAA transitions to 
NextGen operations, surveillance RADAR coverage will be minimized for cost 
savings.  Legacy navigation systems such as VOR and DME will also be gradually 
removed.  While VOR, DME, and RADAR may exist in busy areas of the NAS, it will 
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not be accurate enough for positioning and surveillance via ADS-B.   Without an APNT 
source, in the absence of GPS, safe recovery of aircraft becomes questionable and 
increased capacity is lost in busy airspace.   Without an APNT source suitable for ADS-
B many of the benefits of NextGen would disappear.  
 The operational activities described above were traced to NAS services at the 
enterprise level.  Each activity can be correlated to a service which the FAA is 
mandated to provide to the NAS.   Figure 5 illustrates this correlation.  Note that not all 
mission services are influenced by APNT.  All supporting NextGen programs would be 
considered to gain a complete picture of NAS services. 
 
 
Figure 5: Enterprise Service Traceability 
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Activity Diagrams 
 The operational activities described above were developed in more detail using 
Enterprise Architect (EA).  EA allows the user to build scenario based activity 
diagrams from structured use cases.  This tool is simple to use as a starting point for 
developing activity diagrams.  It offered an easy transition from the CONOPs scenarios 
to activity diagrams.  The first step was to develop the activity (or use case) relationship 
model in Figure 4.  The second step was to flesh out each use case with a basic path in 
the Scenario tool.  Right clicking on any activity in the diagram, opening the 
“properties” tab, followed by the “scenarios” tab, will bring up the window depicted in 
Figure 6.   
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Figure 6: Scenario Based Activity Diagrams 
From here basic paths are developed as the scenarios play out.  Alternate paths can be 
developed at each step based on scenarios described in the CONOPS or other sources.  
Exception paths are entered when an alternate path to the desirable outcome does not 
exist.  These may highlight system shortfalls that need to be addressed.  Other activities 
referenced in Actions are automatically hyperlinked and a hierarchy of activities begins 
to form.  Once all steps are entered EA will automatically generate an activity diagram 
that is consistent with the scenario.  This diagram resembles the DoDAF OV-5 Activity 
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Model.  The output is shown in Figure 7 for ADS-B Out.  The output may not be 
optimized for viewing, or it may not include alternate paths, exceptions, or other details 
that should be included for completeness.  The final draft of the ADS-B Out diagram is 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 7: Auto-generated ADS-B Out 
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Figure 8: Final ADS-B Out 
This is a powerful tool for developing activity diagrams that are consistent with 
scenarios and use cases.  It also provides a convenient way to show the interaction 
between activities.    It is important to remember that the initial auto-generated diagram 
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is only a time saving step and should be thoroughly reviewed to make sure it is clear 
and complete.  Iteration between the activity diagram and underlying use case scenarios 
should be expected. 
 Each complete activity diagram can be used to highlight the alternate paths that 
exist and those which must be utilized in the absence of GPS.  The activities modeled 
are those which relate directly to determining 3D position and time and are predicated 
on the aircraft involved being in controlled airspace and utilizing ANSP services.  
Aircraft operating under visual flight rules (VFR) can always continue to a safe landing 
without the aid of APNT, although benefits of improved SA are lost.  Airline flights 
must file IFR and would be significantly impacted even in good weather.  The alternate 
paths shown generally result in an exception path when no acceptable outcome exits.  If 
a safe, but perhaps less desirable outcome exits, the alternate path is shown.  Detailed 
discussion of some unacceptable outcomes and alternate paths is embedded in the EA 
file and should be continuously updated as the FAA matures its plan for APNT.  Below 
is a brief discussion of the activity diagrams and what they reveal. 
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Figure 9: Determine 3D Position and Time 
The multiple paths for determining an aircraft position are depicted in Figure 9 
above.  Five positioning sources are listed; GPS and APNT being the most precise and 
preferred methods in NextGen 2025.  The accuracy, integrity, and availability of the 
position source will vary depending on the path chosen along with several other factors 
and is not shown in this diagram.   Two important takeaways from this diagram are as 
follows.  First, only GPS or an APNT source compliant with 14 CFR Part 91-314 (the 
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Federal ruling on ADS-B operation and performance) will be acceptable for ADS-B 
Out.  The CFR ruling on ADS-B requires a horizontal position accuracy of 92.6m 
during all phases of flight.    The second point of note is that as legacy navigation aids 
are removed and surveillance RADAR coverage is reduced, no acceptable means of 
determining position would exist in the absence of GPS or APNT.   
Figures 10 and 11 below illustrate Navigation and Surveillance; activities which 
were once carried out by aircrew and the ANSP exclusively.  In NextGen 2025 the lines 
are blurred when surveillance becomes dependent on aircrew (via ADS-B Out) reported 
position.  In the event of GPS interference or outage both surveillance and navigation 
performance levels are reduced or lost entirely. 
The conclusions drawn from all of these architecture products begin to appear 
the same after only a few iterations.  Without stating anything about required 
performance levels (other than GPS is currently the only source that meets all accuracy 
requirements) it is apparent that an APNT source is necessary for navigation and 
dependent surveillance. 
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Figure 10: Navigate 
 
46 
 
Figure 11: Fuse Surveillance Data 
Operational Nodes  
 An Operational Node Diagram, or OV-2, was created in conjunction with the 
Activity diagrams above.  Figure 12 illustrates both the “To-Be” and “As-Is” 
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connectivity of operational nodes relative to APNT.   The functions performed at each 
node are listed.  The connections shown in red are those that must be provided with an 
APNT source.   
 Two critical connections are drawn from the APNT source to the Aircraft and to 
the UAT network.  These connection paths will include the Position reference provided 
by APNT as well as the time reference required for operations in the NAS.  Providing 
position is the primary role of APNT but precision time can be equally as critical.  
Currently, time reference to UTC +/- 30 seconds is all that is required (Federal Aviation 
Administration 2012) for TBO and operations within the NAS.  The red, bolded 
connectors with a “?” attached indicate the potential need for a more precise timing 
reference source.   APNT (in pseudolite form) will require much more precise timing 
synchronization (on the order of Nano seconds) than the operational requirements of 
the NAS.  This may come from the GPS or other GNSS source, or it may come from an 
as yet undefined terrestrial source.    ANSP and UAT functions that rely on TDMA 
communications could also benefit from the presence of an Alternate Precision Timing 
reference to the GPS.  The APNT CONOPs has scoped the FAA’s work to exclude this 
precision timing capability except as required for pseudolite clock synchronization. 
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Figure 12: Operational Node Connectivity 
Performance By Zone 
 The activity diagrams described above indicate the need for position and timing 
reference but they do not provide insight into what level of performance is required.  
Several questions must be asked about the APNT source.  How accurate must my 
position be?  What is the probability accuracy might exceed these limits without my 
being aware of it?  Where, and when must it be available?  The activity diagrams are 
inappropriate for answering these questions because they would have to be modified for 
phase of flight, airspace designation, or other potentially limitless scenarios.  To begin 
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to answer these performance questions, aircraft “states” and APNT “Zones” were 
pulled from the APNT CONOPs and correlated. 
 APNT Zones are defined in Figure 13 below.   The precise definition of Zone 3 
may change to accommodate a larger percentage of arrivals.  The number of airports 
currently being considered for a Zone 3 Terminal area is 135 and is based on the 
amount of traffic that each airport handles in a given year.  Zone 1 and 2 cover all of 
CONUS and are distinguished only by altitude.  There are spaces in this diagram that 
are not to be serviced by APNT.  Everywhere below Zone 2 and Zone 3 cones will be 
without APNT service.  Ground traffic will not be serviced by APNT.  This will have 
an impact on departures and arrivals at airports without a Zone 3 service volume 
overhead, requiring aircraft to climb to 5000’ AGL before reaching navigation service.   
 
Figure 13: APNT Zones 
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 Table 1 describes each aircraft state in the APNT CONOPs.  It is a complete list 
of possible states from the beginning of a flight to the end of a flight.  These aircraft 
states, combined with APNT Zone can be used to define the level of performance 
required from APNT.   In the APNT CONOPS scenarios an aircraft utilizes GPS in 
every state and is affected in some way by loss of GPS.  Refer to the GPS CONOPs for 
a detailed description of these effects.    
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Table 1: Aircraft States 
Aircraft State 
Number 
Aircraft State 
Name 
Description 
01 Parked The aircraft is parked at the gate or on the ramp and the 
starting/ending point for flight 
02 Taxi-Out The aircraft has started taxiing to the assigned runway 
for takeoff 
03 
 
Takeoff Position The aircraft is in position on the runway and ready to 
start the takeoff roll 
04 Takeoff Roll The aircraft is advancing down the runway and lifts off  
05 Initial Climb This is the segment where gear are retracted, power is 
reduced for climb and the aircraft begins to follow the 
flight path for departure 
06 Climb The aircraft is climbing along a prescribed path 
following a departure procedure and there may be level-
offs during the climb for other traffic 
07 Cruise This is the en route phase of flight  
08 Top of Descent A point in space and time where the aircraft will start a 
descent toward the destination 
09 Initial Descent The segment of the descent that begins at the end of 
cruise and continues until the aircraft has begun an 
arrival to an airport 
10 Arrival The segment flown on a path leading to the start of an 
approach procedure; in the Current Environment a 
standard terminal arrival route 
11 Initial Approach Approaching on an intercept to a final approach path 
segment in the Current Environment and any segment 
that leads to a turn to final approach in the target 
environment 
12 Approach The segment between the final approach fix and 
decision height 
13 Missed Approach The path flown that begins at a point inside the final 
approach fix and continues to the missed approach 
waypoint. 
14 Landing From decision height to touchdown 
15 Landing Rollout The segment on the runway where the aircraft is 
decelerating and exiting the runway 
16 Taxi-in The segment where the aircraft is proceeding to the gate 
or ramp 
17 Leader Aircraft The aircraft is leading along a trajectory where another 
aircraft is following and maintaining spacing off of the 
leader 
18 Follower Aircraft The follower is using ADS-B-In information to station 
keep on the leader 
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Based on discussions with the FAA’s APNT team and the APNT CONOPs, 
APNT designs must only support aircraft states 6 through 11.   There is no requirement 
for APNT on the ground.  Ground surveillance from MLAT exists at larger airports.  
For now, secondary airport ground operations may suffer during low visibility in the 
absence of GPS.   APNT is not required beyond the Final Approach Fix (FAF) or in 
terminal areas not covered by Zone 3.  ILS will be used to guide aircraft to the runway 
below approximately 1500’ AGL.  Departures may be delayed or cancelled at smaller 
airports, or for aircraft not equipped with more expensive RNAV equipment.   Figure 
14, below, illustrated which aircraft states are likely to occur in each APNT Zone.  This 
figure is perhaps the most revealing of the architectural products.  The vertical “swim 
lanes” indicate the associated Zone.   The bubbles indicate the aircraft activity or state.  
Notice that several activities are duplicated.  For example, aircraft will be arriving and 
departing from both secondary airports and those serviced by Zone 3 APNT so two 
instances of Arrival are depicted.  Boxes around activities indicate navigation and 
surveillance services provided.  Secondary RADAR coverage and VOR minimum 
operating network (VOR MON) coverage will be significantly reduced in NextGen 
2025, increasing reliance on the GPS and APNT.   
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Figure 14: Operational State by APNT Zone 
  
The attributes, measures, and performance requirements which are used to 
describe an APNT service are common to precision navigation and surveillance sources 
in use today.   Several references are used to build a complete picture of these values 
including U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices.  A compilation of these 
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values can be seen in Appendix A which is taken from the APNT CONOPs.  Columns 
correlating APNT Zone and Aircraft state to performance have been added. 
Appendix A divides criteria into categories of navigation, surveillance, and 
timing.  Each category has unique attributes and measures associated.  Table 2, below, 
outlines the attributes and measures that will be applied to APNT.  The final two, 
capacity and compatibility have been added in this report for completeness.   
Pseudolites, by design and similar to the GPS, have no capacity limit.  Compatibility is 
considered in Chapter V and has many facets.  An APNT system must not interfere 
with other critical NAS systems and it must be integrated into every aircraft that will 
operate in controlled airspace.  
Table 2: Attributes and Measures 
Attributes Measures 
Accuracy 
Navigation Accuracy Code (NAC) - 95% probability 
that reported position is within a specified distance of 
true position 
Integrity 
Navigation Integrity Code (NIC) -10-7 probability of 
exceeding this boundary per flight hour or per 
approach 
Surveillance 
Surveillance Integrity Limit (SIL) - Probability of 
exceeding NIC per flight hour or per approach without 
alarm 
Availability 
Probability of availability per flight hour for any given 
operation 
Continuity 
Probability of continuous avalailability for a prescribed 
time period, given availability at the beginning of an 
operation 
Capacity 
Total number of users simultaneously supported for all 
operations in a given service volume 
Compatibiliy 
Simultaneous operation with other cockpit avionics 
and wireless systems in the NAS. 
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Finally, the minimum performance requirements for each APNT Zone can be derived.  
Traceability from Activity to State to Zone in the preceding sections has been 
established.  The table in Appendix A can be reduced to the most demanding 
requirements in each Zone.  The following steps were taken to reduce Appendix A to 
Table 3. 
 Eliminate all flight operations (rows)  that do not occur in an APNT Zone 
 Compare Accuracy and NAC, keep the lower of the two values.  Surveillance is 
always more demanding. 
 Compare Containment and SIL, keep the lower of the two values.  Again, 
Surveillance is more demanding for all cases.  
 By Aircraft Zone, determine the most demanding performance values in the 
remaining cells. 
 
Table 3: Desired Performance Levels 
 
  
Table 3 provides the performance requirements that will be evaluated in Chapter 
V.   Navigation and surveillance are kept separate to illustrate the more demanding 
requirement that Surveillance will place on an APNT system.  While surveillance 
RADAR systems are still in operation around our nation’s busiest airports the 
performance requirements of APNT might be relaxed to those of navigation.  This table 
Continuity
Accuracy Containment Separation (NACp) (NIC) (SIL)
Airspace Zone (95%) (10-7) /flight hour
S
1
1 2 3-5 0.05 (8) 0.2 (7) 10-7  (3) 10-4
2
1 2 3 0.05 (8) 0.2 (7) 10-7  (3) 10-4
3
0.3 0.6 3 0.05 (8) 0.2 (7) 10-7  (3) 10-5
(>99.0% Availability) RTP1
N/A
1
2
20 sec
(>99.9% Availability)
Navigation Time Performance
Nautical Miles +/- Minutes
Surveillance
Nautical Miles
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answers the simplest question, “How accurate does APNT have to be?”  Any APNT 
source has a desired 95% accuracy of .05 nautical miles (or 92.6 meters) and an 
integrity limit of .2 nautical miles.   This would be sufficient to support 3 mile 
separation of aircraft in all Zones.   
 Table 4 illustrates the minimum performance levels of APNT set by the FAAs 
APNT team.  The APNT team has stated that required performance could be relaxed to 
185 meters for accuracy and 1 nautical mile for integrity.    This is sufficient to support 
5 nautical mile separation and may support safe recovery of aircraft in less congested 
airspace.  It is worth noting here again that CFR Part 91-314, the amendment governing 
ADS-B, mandates 92.6m accuracy for surveillance purposes.   
Table 4: Required Performance Levels 
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Operational Improvements 
 The objective of this section is to determine if the stated performance level and 
implementation of APNT described above will enable the planned Operational 
Improvements of NextGen.  NextGen planning is a collaborative effort between several 
departments of the executive branch, including the Department of Transportation and 
the FAA.  The collective effort is referred to as the Joint Planning and Development 
Office (JPDO).  The JPDO has developed a set of operational improvements to support 
the NextGen operational activities of 2025.  The comprehensive list contains 136 OIs 
that affect flight planning, data sharing and management, navigation, safety, 
environmental protection, and other areas. (JPDO 2012)  The FAA has approved a set 
of 94 OIs (FAA 2012)  that are conveniently categorized by the enterprise level 
services and solution sets they associate with.   For this analysis the list was reduced to 
65 that are related to navigation or are affected by precision navigation and timing.  
 The first step was to combine and consolidate the FAA and JPDO OIs into a 
single list.  The reference numbers of each OI are retained to show where there is 
overlap and which OIs were unique to one organization.   The FAA CONOPs has listed 
the potential impact of GPS interference on each OI in the absence of an APNT source 
and described how APNT might mitigate the impacts.  This was carried through to the 
remaining JPDO OIs.  The level of impact is described on a scale of 1 to 3; a 1 meaning 
the OI would not be possible without APNT or  GPS, 2 meaning the OI would only 
partially be realized, and 3 meaning the OI would be unaffected by GPS outage  
regardless of APNT.   
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 The second step was to associate performance zones and aircraft states to each 
OI.  If an OI applies to more than one zone or state they are listed as well.  In many 
cases the OI applies to ground operations or secondary airports that would not be 
covered by Zone 3.  These are annotated with an “S”, “All”, or the shortfall description 
includes lack of coverage for secondary airports. 
 The third step was to evaluate each OI based on the associated performance 
zone and aircraft state, and the details of the OI as they relate to pseudolite based 
APNT.   The level of APNT support can then be determined on the same 3 point scale 
described above.  If the OI is not supported by APNT the OI receives a 1.  If the OI is 
fully supported it receives a 3.  If APNT is not planned to support the zone associated 
with an OI it receives a 1.  This is an objective association.  OIs that relate to 
supporting general aviation or increasing capacity and flexibility at secondary airports 
are harder to evaluate and the shortfall rating becomes more subjective. 
 Of the 63 OIs evaluated 22 were rated with a 1 or a 2.  The majority of these 
shortfalls are because of a lack of APNT provided on the surface.  The second most 
common shortfall is due to incomplete coverage of the NAS.  APNT Zone 2 will only 
serve 5000’ AGL and above and Zone 3 is only planned at 135 airports.  Secondary 
airports will not be supported by APNT and many OIs relate to increasing access and 
flexibility at secondary airports.   A third common shortfall is due to lack of precision 
or service during the approach phase of flight.  Many OIs that promise to increase 
capacity in busy airspace or continued seamless operation during GPS outage rely on 
precision approaches and RNAV flexibility.  If APNT is limited to supporting only 
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navigation to an ILS approach these OIs may only partially be supported.  Figure 15 
below is a section of the complete OI shortfall analysis posted here for convenience.  
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Figure 15: OI Shortfall Traceability Matrix
FAA 
Identifier
JPDO 
Identifier
Targeted 
NextGen 
Capability For 
2025
APNT Function Impact
APNT 
Supported?
APNT Gap Key Attributes
Aircraft 
States
Performance 
Zone
Name Description Benefits Solution Set Service
105208 303
Provides information to 
the ANSP when APNT is 
in use to identify GPS 
system area outages
1 3
Availability, 
Compatibility, 
Capacity
All All
Traffic Management Initiatives 
with Flight Specific Trajectories
Individual flight-specific trajectory 
changes resulting from Traffic 
Management Initiatives (TMIs) will be 
disseminated to the appropriate Air 
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) 
automation for tactical approval and 
execution.  This capability will increase 
the agility of the NAS to adjust and 
respond to dynamically changing 
* Improved efficiency
* Increased capacity
* Improved predictability
* Reduced fuel-burn and 
aircraft emissions
Improve 
Collaborative ATM
TM-Strategic Flow
101103 306 x
Provides position to 
airborne and ground 
automation to continue 
the capability to 
exchange flight planning 
information and 
negotiate flight 
trajectory agreement 
amendments
2 2
Not provided on 
surface
Availability, 
Continuity
All All
Provide Interactive Flight 
Planning from Anywhere
Flight planning activities are 
accomplished from the flight deck as 
readily as any location. Airborne and 
ground automation provide the 
capability to exchange flight planning 
information and negotiate flight 
trajectory agreement amendments in 
near real-time. The key change is that 
the Air Navigation Service Provider's 
Increased efficiency
Increased accessibility
Enhanced user-preferred 
trajectories
Initiate Trajectory 
Based Operations
Flight Planning
104122 307
Provides position to 
continue RNP and RNAV 
operations while 
maintaining 3nm 
separation standards 2 3
Accuracy, 
Compatibility
6, 8-13 1, 3
Integrated Arrival/Departure 
Airspace Management
New airspace design takes advantage of 
expanded use of terminal procedures 
and separation standards.  This is 
particularly applicable in major 
metropolitan areas supporting multiple 
high-volume airports.  This increases 
aircraft flow and introduces additional 
routes and flexibility to reduce delays. 
ANSP decision support tools are 
* Maximizes throughput
* Improved efficiency
* Reduced flight time
* Reduced noise
* Reduced fuel burn and 
engine emissions
Increase 
Arrivals/Departures 
at High Density 
Airports
TM-
Synchronization
104124 309
Enables aircraft to 
remain on original flight 
plan to include the most 
economical point in 
which to begin a descent 
using the most 
economical power
1 3 Accuracy 8-11 3
Use Optimized Profile Descent Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs) 
permit aircraft to remain at higher 
altitudes on arrival to the airport and 
use lower power settings during 
descent.  OPD arrival procedures will 
decrease noise and be more fuel-
efficient.  The air navigation service 
provider procedures and automation 
accommodate OPDs when operationally 
*Reduced noise
*Reduced fuel-burn and 
engine emissions
Increase Flexibility 
in the Terminal 
Environment
TM-
Synchronization
310
Provides position to GA 
aircraft for ADS-B 
positioning for more 
direct routing through 
busy terminal area 
airspace
1 2
Cost prohibits acces 
to GA
Accuracy, 
Availability, 
Integrity, 
Compatibility, 
Capacity
6-11 3
Improved GA Access to Traverse 
Terminal Areas
This Operational Improvement (OI) 
results in increased access to busy 
airspace, such as Class B, for General 
Aviation (GA) operators. More direct 
routing for GA operators is facilitated 
through improved access to traverse 
busy terminal area airspace via the 
continued use and possible expansion 
of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Flyways as 
Increased efficiency
Increased accessibility
Enhanced user-preferred 
trajectories
Increase Flexibility 
in the Terminal 
Environment
ATC-Separation 
Assurance
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This iteration of pairing OIs to performance is an incomplete example of how 
APNT will support NextGen 2025 but it does illustrate the discontinuity between stated 
objectives and planned performance.   This method of relating APNT performance to 
Operational Improvements should be iterated with each decision milestone of APNT 
planning as details are fleshed out.   APNT does appear to support the four pillars 
described in the CONOPS but one should ask: “What system will fill the APNT gaps 
highlighted?    
The APNT team has highlighted the following four “pillars” of APNT. 
 Safe recovery (landing) of aircraft flying in Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC) under Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) operations 
 Strategic modification of flight trajectories to avoid areas of interference and 
manage demand within the interference area  
 Continued dispatch of air carrier operations to deny an economic target for an 
intentional jammer 
 Flight operations continue without a significant increase in workload for either the 
pilot or the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) during an interference event.  
 
  APNT will provide means for a safe recovery of aircraft but may not allow aircraft to 
arrive at their intended destination.  APNT will allow modification of trajectories but is 
constrained by APNT Zone coverage.  APNT will allow continued dispatch of aircraft, 
but at potentially reduced capacity due to less precise positioning until at altitude or 
non-universal equipage.  Continued operation without an increase in workload will 
require that flight planning be based on the least capable navigation system available 
for a given operation.  For example, if GPS allows less than 3 mile separation in busy 
airspace and aircraft are allowed to reduce separation, in the event of a GPS outage, 
controllers will have to manage re-spacing aircraft as navigation reverts to APNT.   
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Relying on ILS for approach could also significantly increase workloads as aircraft are 
re-routed to available approaches.  
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IV. UHARS System Architecture & Signal Performance Analysis 
Chapter Overview 
 Chapter IV takes a closer look at Locata and the UHARS as they could be 
applied to the APNT problem.  The first section is a collection of Systems Views (SVs) 
that describe the architecture of a Locata network.  They illustrate the system nodes, 
connections, and related functionality of a Locata Net.  In principle, these SVs could 
describe an APNT system on a continental scale but in reality it is precisely this scale 
that will raise issues. 
 The second section describes the signal structure of Locata and proposes 
potential changes to certain properties.  Most changes to the Locata signal reflect the 
need to integrate with existing radio systems in the ARNS band while propagating an 
APNT signal for over 100nmi from hundreds of sites around the country.  With the 
proper signal masking it may be possible to increase the range of a Locata pseudolite 
with few other changes to the signal and those options are presented here as well. 
 The final sections describe the predicted performance levels of a potential signal 
structure and pseudolite network.  The primary measure of positioning performance 
here is user range error (URE).  Factors such as DOP from poor signal geometry, or 
unpredictable tropospheric errors may have a large effect on positioning accuracy and 
are only roughly modeled.   Based on the estimated service volume and accuracy of 
each pseudolite, a rough estimate of the number of pseudolites required to cover Zones 
1, 2, and 3 can be obtained.  This analysis has been completed for other APNT 
solutions and is referenced here. 
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System Architecture 
 Locata networks have two primary segments.  The first is the terrestrial segment 
of pseudolites.  This can be compared to the space segment of the GPS or other GNSS.  
Each pseudolite broadcasts a ranging signal with an over-laid data stream that includes 
(but is not limited to) surveyed location on the surface of the earth.  GPS satellites 
broadcast orbital parameters that can be used to compute their position as a function of 
time.  The second segment is the user segment, which is the same as the GPS user 
segment.   User equipment compares ranging signals from multiple pseudolites (in the 
same manner as GPS satellites) which are presumably transmitted simultaneously or 
with known error.   These ranging signals can be used to determine user position and 
clock error relative to the pseudolites’ frame of reference.  Locata nets and the UHARS 
do not have a control segment like the GPS.  Once Locata nets are surveyed and 
initialized they become autonomous although not entirely independent.  Exceptions 
include time synchronization and meteorological data collection.  Locata pseudolites 
require an external time reference to maintain synchronization to UTC.  Within the 
Locata network time is maintained by referencing the phase of signals sent between 
pseudolites via line of site radios.  This is referred to as TimeLoc.  The UHARS utilizes 
this method of time synchronization.  To correct for tropospheric signal delay 
pseudolites broadcast meteorological data including temperature, pressure, and relative 
humidity.  Collecting this information requires additional hardware. 
 Locata network and signal architecture resembles the GPS in many ways.   
There are a few key differences so solve problems that arise when operating a terrestrial 
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pseudolite system.   TimeLoc is perhaps the most unique aspect of Locata technology.   
GNSS require multiple precise clocks on board each satellite and extensive control 
segments to keep each satellite clock synchronized.   Locata gets around this challenge 
by linking each pseudolite to a master pseudolite and synchronizing their navigation 
signals to phase level accuracy.  Each slave LocataLite receives the navigation signal 
broadcast by the master LocateLite.   Based on surveyed distance between the 
LocataLites and signal error correction models, the slave LocataLite can determine the 
cycle ambiguity of the pseudo-ranging signal to approximately 6 cycles (Locata 
Corporation 2011).  In this manner, with no outside time or frequency reference, the 
inexpensive quartz oscillator in the master LocataLite is sufficient for nano-second time 
synchronization and centimeter level accuracy.  The trade-off is that TimeLoc requires 
a line of sight wireless link between each pseudolite.   
 The second unique quality of Locata technology, relative to GNSS,  is its 
adaptation to solve the near-far problem of received signal strength.  GNSS benefit 
from nearly uniform separation between any user’s receiver and the satellite 
constellation.   The 23dB of separation provided by the 1023 chip Pseudo Random 
Noise (PRN) code is more than adequate to separate multiple signals.  User range to a 
LocataLite in a UHARS scale application may vary from hundreds of meters to a 
hundred kilometers.  Receiver dynamic range could not accommodate simultaneous 
reception of both near and far signals.  Locata incorporates a TDMA scheme to further 
separate the signals of each Locate Lite.  Figure 16 illustrates this and will be described 
in detail later in the chapter.  What should be noted here is that each TDMA frame 
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offers 10 time slots to broadcast a navigation signal.  In this manner, up to 10 
LocataLites could theoretically broadcast using the same PRN code in the same 
geographic area and not interfere with each other. 
 
Figure 16:  Locata / UHARS TDMA Architecture (Locata Corporation 2011) 
 A complete Locata Network is divided into SubNets made up of up to 10 
LocataLites each.  There are enough unique PRN codes defined in the Locata Interface 
Control Document (ICD) to accommodate 5 SubNets without the potential for overlap.  
As long as each SubNet remains geographically separated, PRN codes could be 
duplicated if more than 5 SubNets are required.  Figure 17 illustrates the myriad of 
ways in which a LocataNet and its SubNets may be related.  In any LocataNet there is 
one master reference which carries its own time reference or is fed an external 
(commonly derived from GPS) time reference updated at 1Hz.  The remaining 
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LocataLites in the network become slaves to the master LocataLite via TimeLoc.  Note 
in Figure 17 that subnet 2 has cascaded the TimeLoc synchronization one level.  9 
LocataLites in subnet 2 are slaved to an intermediate master.  All LocataLites in Subnet 
3 are slaved to a single slave LocataLite in Subnet 2.  All LocataLites in Subnet 4 are 
slaves to the original master LocataLite in Subnet 1.  The Master-Slave relationship is 
independent of the subnet structure of a LocataNet.   Master-Slave relationships would 
likely be determined by the most efficient means of connecting all LocataLites with the 
fewest number of TimeLoc hops.  Subnet relationships are carefully determined during 
initial setup to ensure dynamic separation of LocataLite signals and will determine the 
assignment of PRN codes and TDMA slot assignments for each LocataLite. 
68 
 
Figure 17: LocataNet TimeLoc Architecture 
 Figure 18 illustrates the connectivity between LocataLites and user positioning 
Receivers.  In this particular network, NavSignal 3 comes directly from the master 
LocataLite.   NavSignals 1, 2, 4, and 5, come from LocataLites that are TimeLocked to 
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the master.  NavSignal 6 comes from a LocataLite that is separated from the master and 
requires TimeLoc to be cascaded via Slave 4.  This APNT receiver is receiving ranging 
signals from 6 LocataLites: an over-determined solution.   To determine a user’s 
position, the Locata Receiver requires a minimum of four LocataLite signals.  Three 
signals to solve for position in 3 dimensions and a fourth signal to solve for the 
receiver’s clock uncertainty.  Reception from a fifth LocataLite creates an over-
determined solution can be used to detect false signals or erroneous signals.  GPS 
receivers use these over-determined solutions for Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (RAIM).   This added integrity is required for use during approaches.  Over 
determined solutions are not difficult to come by when utilizing a GNSS.  Having 10-
12 satellites in view and tracked is not uncommon.   Pseudolites present a much greater 
challenge because the likelihood of having many signals in range and in view is lower.  
To reduce the number of required pseudolites in view the role of integrity monitoring is 
shifted from the receiver and barometric altitude measured at the aircraft is used to aid 
the solution.  This will allow an APNT pseudolite receiver to provide a position fix and 
receiver clock correction with only three signals.  This diagram does not depict that 
each LocataLite actually transmits the same coded signal on two separate carrier 
frequencies, each from a physically separated antenna, for multi-path interference 
mitigation.  This duplicity is removed from the diagram for clarity as it does not lend to 
an over-determined position. 
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Figure 17: LocataLite Signal Connectivity  
Signal Properties and Spectrum Usage 
 This section will cover several properties of the Locata and UHARS ranging 
signals and their effect on ranging performance.   Many of these properties could 
remain the same if Locata is scaled up to meet APNT requirements while a few may 
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have to change.  Locata was developed as a commercially available positioning system 
and meets certain constraints that would not apply to an APNT system.   Of course, 
APNT brings along its own requirements and constraints.  Three primary differences to 
keep in mind when reading the following section are as follows.   First, Locata and the 
UHARS operate in the 2.4-2.5 GHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band.  
This band does not require a license to operate but must accept interference from other 
users and places limits on the power that can be transmitted.  APNT will operate in the 
ARNS band that does not directly limit power output but does require new systems to 
operate on a non-interference basis.  Secondly, APNT will cover much greater ranges.  
Locata was designed to operate indoors or in urban environments at ranges of less than 
a mile.  APNT will almost certainly require signals to be effective at 100 nautical miles 
or more so that the number of pseudolites required is affordable.   Thirdly, APNT 
system accuracy requirements can be relaxed from centimeters to nearly 100 meters. 
 Locata was modeled after the GPS.  This is evident in the opening paragraphs of 
Locata’s ICD.  The direct sequence, bi-phase shift keying spread spectrum signal was 
modified to fit into the 2.4GHz ISM band.  The data stream was modified to 
accommodate stationary pseudolites.  And the number of PRN codes in use was 
increased to accommodate an increase in signals on the network, although the method 
of generating each PRN code remains the same. 
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Carrier Frequency 
 The carrier frequency chosen for Locata and UHARS, as stated above, was 
confined to the 2.4 GHz ISM band.  LocataLites each transmit two signals, 
differentiated by carrier frequency and PRN code, from each antenna (usually two) for 
multipath mitigation.  The two carrier frequencies chosen for Locata and UHARS are 
2414.28 MHz (S1) and 2465.43 MHz (S6).  These frequencies were chosen partly for 
their convenient relationship to GPS carrier frequencies.  A baseband oscillator used in 
any GPS receiver will have a frequency of approximately 10.23 MHz     .  GPS L1 at 
1575.42 MHz is 154 times the base oscillator.   Locata S1 is 236 times   , Locata S6 is 
241 times   .  Keeping receiver frequency plans as similar as possible can reduce cost 
and complexity of receivers designed for dual use.  The analysis in this thesis limits 
carrier frequency choices to multiples of 10.23 MHz. 
APNT will operate in the ARNS band between 960 MHz and 1215 MHz.  The 
myriad of systems already occupying this band is covered in Chapter II of this thesis.  
The design of an APNT signal will have to fit within the ARNS band without 
interfering with other systems.   Accommodations could be made for a new APNT 
signal, such as removing specific DME channels from widespread use, or limiting the 
transmission power at certain sites.  This was done for the addition of GPS L5 when 
seven channels of JTIDS/Link 16 were marked for operation on a non-interference 
basis.  Figure 19 illustrates the complexity of the ARNS band.  In this figure each 
column represents the center frequency of an occupied channel.  Signal properties such 
as data overlays or spreading codes will “widen” these channels.  The magnitude of 
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each column is only to represent the related system and usage, not the relative power 
density or any kind of priority.   For example, all DME Ground reply channels are 
approximately the same height for easier identification and those channels 
recommended for removal are slightly shorter.   
Figure 19 reveals a few unoccupied or less frequently used bands that should be 
considered for APNT use.  The most prominent gaps are those within DME channels to 
accommodate ATCRBS.  The ATCRBS signal has a data overlay that spreads the 
signal and interferes with DME signals that might broadcast within +/- 10 MHz of 1030 
or 1090 MHz.  DME channels are paired for air-ground interrogation and ground-air 
reply.  They are also paired for air-air usage by the military and for VORTAC, 
TACAN, and ILS usage.  These relationships have left a few channels less frequently 
used even though they are not adjacent to ATCRBS.  This means that allocating a 
specific frequency to a new APNT system may affect more than one system and more 
than one channel.   Minimizing these impacts should be considered.  The FAA has 
designated certain channels of DME as “uncommon”.  The DoD has designated 
approximately the same channels for mobile TACAN use which, at least domestically 
or for long periods of time, would be in uncommon usage.  These uncommon channels 
are the shortest in Figure 19.   Usable gaps occur at 960-977 MHz, and 1147-1156 
MHz.  1147-1156 could be expanded to nearly 20 MHz by eliminating DME channels 
70x-76x.  Because the paired frequencies of 1094-1100 MHz are adjacent to 1090 
MHz, these channels are in less common usage.  107 paired VORs would be affected in 
the NAS today if these 7 channels are removed.  This bands proximity to GPS L5, a 
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low power signal, makes it less desirable.  DME channel associations and pairings are 
described in detail in the National Aviation Standard for VOR/DME/TACAN (FAA 
1984).  DME channels 49x-59x could be eliminated and free up 1010 MHz to 1020 
MHz.  This 10 MHz band is less desirable because of its proximity to 1030 MHz 
ATCRBS.   The third potential availability lies between 960 MHz and 977 MHz.  This 
17 MHz band lies between the bottom end of ARNS and the UAT at 978 MHz.  It is 
occupied by the DME portion of TACAN channels assigned to mobile TACAN, three 
JTIDS channels, and one DME channel assigned to facility and equipment maintenance 
on the ground.  Frequencies adjacent to 960 MHz could potentially be affected by 
systems outside the ARNS band.  The effects of cell phone operations at 950-960 MHz 
can have an effect on DME channels below 970 MHz (Electronic Communications 
Committee, CEPT 2007).  The UAT system operating at 978 MHz bounds the other 
end of this potential window.  UATs will exist on nearly every aircraft as the primary 
means of transmitting and receiving ADS-B.  They will also operate at nearly 800 sites 
across the NAS as ADS-B GBTs.  There seems to be a consensus that this band from 
960-977 is the most likely choice for any addition to the ARNS band (STAR 2006) (Lo, 
Pseudolite Alternatives for Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 
2012) (ICAO 2005).  The following sections of this thesis will consider the 
performance of a UHARS like APNT signal in the 960-970 MHz band. 
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Figure 18: ARNS Band Usage 
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Spreading Codes and Chipping Rate 
 Locata utilizes a direct sequence bi-phase shift keying (DS-BPSK) spreading 
code.  The direct sequence codes (PRN codes) are the same codes used by the GPS with 
the addition of codes to accommodate up to 200 unique channels on a LocataNet.  The 
chipping rate of Locata and UHARS code is ten times faster than the GPS.  Increasing 
the chipping rate to 10.23 Million chips per second spreads the signal wider but also 
increases the theoretical accuracy of the code tracking delay lock loops in the receiver.  
Because the ARNS band is quite crowded a high powered wide-band signal would be 
more difficult to integrate.  Reducing the chipping rate, at the expense of accuracy, is 
one way to reduce the interference of an APNT signal on neighboring ARNS systems.  
Changing the format of the spreading code, other than the chipping rate, was not 
considered in this analysis. 
 The chipping rate of a DS-BPSK signal is related to the signal’s power spectrum 
density (S) in Equation 1.   Band pass filters at the transmitter and receiver can 
generally mask all but the main center lobe.  Therefore, the minimum “bandwidth” of 
any signal is about twice the chipping rate.  Figure 20 is a PSD plot of the UHARS 
signal at the transmitter antenna.  Reducing the chipping rate will make the lobes of this 
plot taller and skinnier.  The bold green line represents the masked signal when an 8-
pole 20 MHz band pass filter is applied.  The masking filter minimally affects the 
power contained in the main lobe of the signal but can reduce power transmitted by 60 
dB only 10 MHz from the center frequency.  The masking filter is derived from the 
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band bass filter used in the UHARS demonstration manufactured by L-Com, model 
number BPF24-809. 
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Figure 20: UHARS Transmitted Signal 
 The delay lock loop (DLL) of a receiver tracks the phase changes in the signal 
generated with each chip.  This method of “code tracking” is less precise than carrier 
phase tracking but is more robust.  UHARS 3D RMS accuracy was reduced from about 
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18cm carrier solution to 25 cm code solution (Craig 2011).  As chipping rate of the 
code increases the duration of each chip is reduced and precision is improved.  The 
duration of each chip is converted to range when multiplied by c, the speed of light.  
Equation 2 relates chipping rate and received SNR to DLL pseudorange error.  Note 
that TC is directly proportional to the standard deviation of DLL error. 
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  Figure 20 illustrates the relationship between chipping rate, received signal strength, 
and DLL accuracy.  Error values in the plot are 95% RMS, or 2σ.  UHARS receivers 
generally receive -100 dBW to -130 dBW of power.  In this plot, receiver correlator 
spacing is set to 1 chip, received white noise PSD is set to -150 dBW/Hz, and the DLL 
bandwidth is .005 Hz.  At PC = -130 dBW, the DLL accuracy is reduced to 1.75 meters, 
or doubled, if chipping rate is reduced to 5.115 MCps.  Reducing chipping rate by as 
much as ten times, to 1.023 MCps, may still provide enough ranging precision to meet 
the 92.6 meter goal of APNT and significantly narrow the bandwidth of an APNT 
signal. 
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Figure 21: DLL Ranging Precision and Chipping Rate 
 
TDMA and Receiver Dynamic Range 
 Figure 16 illustrates the TDMA scheme used by Locata and UHARS to 
overcome the near far problem.   Each LocataLite is assigned a 100µs N-slot during 
every 1ms TDMA frame.  During each subsequent 1ms TDMA frame the LocataLite 
will transmit during a different N-slot based on a pseudo-random schedule.  This 
pseudo-random pattern ensures that clock errors between LocataLites would not 
otherwise cause overlapping transmissions to occur repeatedly.   The TDMA slot 
assignments repeat every 200ms.    
 At a chipping rate of 10.23MCps, an entire 1023 chip PRN code is transmitted 
in one 100µs N-slot.  At a data rate of 100 bps, ten complete code epochs are received 
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in the duration of each bit.   The integer ratio of cycles to chips, chips to code epoch, 
code epoch to TDMA slot, and TDMA slot to data bits is not mandatory in the design 
of a receiver.  If these integer relationships are altered by, for example, halving the 
chipping rate so there are 511.5 chips per TDMA slot, the receiver acquisition and 
tracking capabilities should be evaluated in future research.   
 By assigning each LocataLite on a subnet a unique TDMA slot, up to 10 
LocataLites can be in the same geographic area and significantly varied ranges from the 
user receiver and not interfere with each other.  Because there is some cross correlation 
between the PRN codes of each LocataLite, a receiver could misinterpret a PRN code if 
its received signal is more than 23dB from other pseudolites.  This 23dB separation 
between cross correlation peaks could be increased to 33dB of separation by increasing 
the code lengths to 10230 chips, as was done in the new GPS L5 signal (Enge 2003).   
It is not unreasonable to imagine an aircraft flying only a few thousand feet above an 
APNT pseudolite, or a range of about .5nmi.  At .5nmi from pseudolite A the APNT 
receiver would have trouble distinguishing pseudolite B if it was more than 8nmi away.  
This would severely limit the service volume of each pseudolite and the number of 
pseudolites required to cover all APNT zones.  33dB of separation might provide 
20nmi maximum range but this is still unacceptable for APNT.   
 The cost of this TDMA scheme is accumulated power of the received signal at 
the Locata receiver.  Because the LocataLite is only transmitting 10% of the time, the 
accumulated energy is 10% of a continuous transmission.   In other words, to the 
Locata receiver, a LocataLite transmitting 10W for 100µs of each ms appears to be 
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transmitting at only 1W.  This becomes a challenge when interference with neighboring 
systems is considered.  For example, a UAT on the ground broadcasts its entire 
message during 5 to 10ms of each second.  To the UAT, a LocataLite is transmitting at 
10W for 20% of this time which is likely to cause enough interference to be considered 
continuous transmission.  A UAT must be capable of tolerating co-channel interference 
of -86dBW if pulsed as a DME signal, or up to 3600 3.5µs pulse pairs per second, , but 
only -131dBW if continuous (MILSTD-291C 1998).  Increasing the duration of a 
TDMA N-slot to 200µs and reducing the number of slots in a frame to five would 
double the accumulated energy at the Locata receiver without adversely affecting 
nearby UATs.  It would, however, reduce the number of possible LocataLites in a 
geographic subnet from 10 to 5.    
Power & Service Volume  
 Transmitted power will have the greatest effect of any signal characteristic 
considered in this thesis on the effective range, or service volume, of an APNT 
pseudolite.  LocataLites for commercial use are restricted to 1W transmission in the 
2.4GHz ISM band.  UHARS received a waiver to transit at up to 10W on the White 
Sands range.  The ARNS band places no blanket restrictions on transmission power.   
The maximum transmission power levels of each system are uniquely defined to 
prevent unwanted interference.  Minimum transmission power is determined in order to 
provide a guaranteed service volume for each system.   This service volume will partly 
determine how many pseudolites are required to cover all APNT zones.   
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 UHARS pseudolites transmit 10W at 2.414 and 2.465GHz.  Testing at 
Holloman indicated a service volume with a radius of approximately 30nmi and up to at 
least 25,000 feet.   Many of the legacy navigation aids in service today provide service 
out to 130nmi.  For ease of comparison, a service volume with a 40 nautical mile radius 
up to 18,000 feet and 130nmi from 18,000 feet to 45,000 feet is considered.   
 
Figure 19: Standard Service Volume-High 
 To increase the service volume of an APNT pseudolite power will have to 
increase.   A significant increase in service volume already comes from reducing the 
carrier frequency of the navigation signal.  The effective area of the receiver antenna is 
related to the square of the carrier wavelength as shown in Equation 3.    
                                                    
   
 
  
                                                      (3) 
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If transmitter power remained at 10W and    is reduced from 2414 MHz to 971 MHz, 
the same power is received at 75nmi as was received at 30nmi.   Received power, user 
range, and carrier frequency are related in Equation 4.   
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To acquire and track a signal from a UHARS LocataLite, the minimum received 
power for a UHARS receiver is approximately -130 dBW (Craig 2011).  AGPS 
receiver certified for precision approach use will acquire a signal with a minimum 
power level of approximately -150dBW.  This is a significant difference in receiver 
sensitivity.  Based on Equation 4, an improvement of 20dB in receiver sensitivity could 
increase the range of the UHARS signal to over 200nmi without any increase in power 
or modification to the signal.  An increase in the sensitivity of Locata receivers for the 
purpose of APNT could be studied in future work.  This thesis assumes that any APNT 
system modeled after Locata and the UHARS would have to demonstrate feasibility 
without significant modification to receiver capabilities.   
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Antennas and Filters 
The antennas chosen for a new APNT system will affect the predicted service 
volume of each pseudolite as well as their influence on other systems in the ARNS 
band.  The antenna pattern chosen for ground transmitters will likely be isotropic in the 
horizontal plane but will concentrate power between the horizon and approximately 60 
degrees above the horizon.  Legacy navigation systems such as VOR and DME 
generally do not provide reliable reception above approximately 40 degrees.  Figure 23 
illustrates the vertical antenna pattern of a commercially available broadband antenna 
used for Mode-S squitter and ADS-B transmissions (dB Systems Inc. 2012).  To be 
conservative, an antenna with gain pattern that is isotropic in azimuth and uniformly 
spread between -10 degrees below the horizon is applied.  This results in a transmitter 
gain of 2.3dB.   A gain of 10dB or more could significantly increase the range of a 
UHARS pseudolite and is not unrealistic, although a corresponding increase in 
interference to nearby systems would also be felt.   Because fixed navigational aids are 
not power limited like satellites or LocataLites, antenna gain is more useful for 
directing energy where it is desired rather than simply increasing effective range. 
The antenna pattern chosen for the aircraft receiver in the UHARS 
demonstration was a custom designed quadrifiliar helix antenna.  A monopole antenna 
or blade on the belly of an aircraft would have limited reception range in the vertical 
axis.  A patch antenna on the belly of the aircraft would severely limit the horizontal 
range of the UHARS network.  The custom helical antenna offered sufficient gain in 
the vertical axis to receive pseudolite ranging signals below the aircraft without 
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compromising horizontal gain.  Reception of pseudolite signals below the aircraft is 
important for maintaining good geometry when determining altitude.  Because APNT 
may rely on barometric altitude for vertical positioning a standard monopole antenna 
may be sufficient.  A study by RTCA on appropriate aircraft antennas for ADS-B UAT 
usage determined that a 5/8 λ monopole antenna could provide approximately 5dB gain 
in the horizontal plane (UPS Aviation Technologies 2001).  While gain in the vertical 
axis might be significantly less, a UHARS signal at 20W would only require a receiver 
gain of -5dB to reach a pseudolite 55,000’ directly below it.  The ability to use existing 
antennas for dual purpose could simplify the installation of new APNT hardware on 
aircraft.  A receiver antenna with an isotropic gain of 5dB is assumed in this analysis. 
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Figure 20: Ground Transmitter Antenna Gain 
 Adding a bandpass filter to any broadband signal will significantly reduce the 
amount of interference received by neighboring systems.  An APNT signal in the 960-
970 MHz range must be masked appropriately to avoid interference with systems below 
960MHz or the UATs that operate at 978MHz.   An APNT pseudolite broadcasting a 
given signal will have a minimum standoff range from any UAT to avoid interference.  
Because there will be over 800 ground based UATs and countless more airborne UATs 
operating in the NAS, minimizing the standoff distance is important.  Figure 24 
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illustrates a potential APNT signal modeled after the UHARS and operating without a 
bandpass filter.  As power transmitted by the pseudolite is increased in the Y axis, the 
effective range of the pseudolite increases on the X axis, but so does the minimum 
standoff distance from a UAT to avoid interference.  In this model the chipping rate is 
reduced to 5.115MCps to narrow the signal.  The TDMA slot is increased to 200ms to 
increase the received code power at the pseudolite.  The center frequency is placed at 
971MHz.  Lowering the center frequency may require concession from users outside 
the ARNS band.   Even with these modifications, an APNT pseudolite powered to 
reach 130nmi would have to remain 20nmi from the nearest UAT;  an impossible 
requirement.  Applying a bandpass filter can reduce this minimum separation to just a 
few meters. 
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Figure 21: Pseudolite-UAT Separation, No Filtering 
Network Size and Performance 
 In 2012 the MITRE Corporation was funded to conduct a study on DME/DME 
based RNAV coverage of CONUS (Niles, et al. 2012).  The objective was to determine 
if current DME sites provide sufficient coverage of CONUS airspace to meet RNAV 
1.0 requirements.   Where there are gaps in DME coverage or unnecessary sites existed 
they were indicated.  The methods used in this study could be applied to determine the 
number and location of pseudolites necessary to cover all APNT Zones.   
 The first step in the MITRE study was to model DME/DME RNAV 
requirements.  RNAV 1.0 requires a 1-σ Horizontal Position Error (HPE) of .866nmi 
(FAA 2005).  A Horizontal DOP (HDOP) was assumed to be 2.82.  Maximum User 
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Range Error (URE) is then approximately .3nmi.  For APNT, the requirement for 2-σ 
HPE is 92.6m.   If an HDOP of 2.82 is assumed, maximum URE is 16.3m.  DME/DME 
RNAV only requires two DME sites to determine a receiver position.  A pseudolite 
analysis should include three pseudolites or more in any position fix (≥4 if barometric 
altitude is not incorporated).  The sensitivity of coverage to the number of solutions 
required was explored in 2010 by Sherman Lo, et al (Lo, Pseudolite Alternatives for 
Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 2012).  Interestingly, coverage 
at 5000’ AGL (Zone 2) was not significantly improved when only two signals are 
required.  The mountainous areas of the western United States remain poorly covered in 
either case.  Use of a DME site is restricted to ≥3nmi, ≤130nmi and ≤40
o
 elevation 
angle.   As a starting point, 130nmi maximum range can be modeled.  The restrictions 
on minimum user range and elevation angle can be lifted.  The MITRE study modeled 
Zone 3 cones over the busiest 65 of the 135 airports listed in the APNT CONOPS.  A 
complete pseudolite analysis should cover all 135 airports.  920 DME sites were 
considered in the MITRE model.  Because APNT Pseudolites could be most 
conveniently placed at existing FAA sites a pseudolite coverage analysis should include 
these 920 DME sites as well as any VORs located without DME.  Finally, “users” were 
modeled in a 4 nautical mile grid pattern over all of CONUS.   The altitude of each user 
was determined by the lower of 18,000’ MSL enroute, or the bottom of a Zone 3 cone 
at the user’s location, taking into account minimum IFR altitudes of 1000’ or 2000’ 
AGL.  Terrain masking effects that restrict line-of-sight between the DME site and user 
were considered as they should be when evaluating APNT.  The differences between 
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the MITRE evaluation of DME for RNAV and pseudolites for APNT are summarized 
in Table 5. 
Table 5: DME RNAV vs Pseudolite APNT Constraints 
Constraint DME RNAV Pseudolite APNT 
Airports with Zone 3 65 135 
User Spacing 4nmi 4nmi 
Max. URE 555m 16.4m 
Min.  # Transmitters  2 3 
Max. PDOP 2.82 2.82 
Service Volume 3-130nmi according to 
receiver height 
0-130nmi according to 
receiver height above ground 
Max. Elevation Angle 40
o 
90
o 
Min. Receiver 
Altitude 
18,000’ enroute  
>1000’ AGL in Zone 3 
Zone 2 enroute 
>500’ AGL in Zone 3 
  
Given the above constraints, each user’s location was evaluated to determine if 
a valid DME/DME position fix would be possible.  The current DME network provided 
a valid fix to 98% of CONUS airspace.  Varying the minimum altitude used in a Zone 3 
approach up to 2000’AGL from 500’ AGL improved coverage to 98.33%.  When the 
DME network was evaluated assuming repair to all low altitude DMEs and repair to all 
restricted DMEs, coverage increased to 99.14%.   
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To determine the size requirements of a future DME RNAV system, MITRE 
modified their model to require 100% coverage of CONUS and asked the question: 
How many DME sites will be required and where should they be placed?  920 DME 
sites, 4572 public airports, and 258 additional new sites were considered in a Voronoi 
process.  After two passes a minimum network of DMEs that included new sites, and 
the removal of unnecessary sites was determined.   A total of 491 sites were required to 
cover all of CONUS if Zone 3 service does not go below 1000’ AGL.  An additional 26 
sites were required to expand Zone 3 coverage to 500’ AGL.  Although many ILS 
intercept altitudes are well above 1000’ AGL, an analysis of APNT pseudolites should 
require coverage as low as 500’ AGL.  The APNT requirement for three pseudorange 
measurements to determine a fix could have a significant impact on the number of sites 
required for pseudolite coverage.  Increasing the number of Zone 3 airports will also 
increase the number of pseudolites required for complete coverage. 
Tropospheric and Multipath Errors 
 UHARS and other pseudolite signals propagate through the Troposphere for 
significantly greater ranges than a GNSS.  Because light travels slower through the 
troposphere (especially wet troposphere) the ranging signal is delayed and interpreted 
by the receiver as a longer than actual range.  Pseudolites benefit from not having to 
transit the ionosphere which can be significantly more difficult to model.  Locata has 
incorporated a tropospheric error modeling algorithm that was first applied in 
simulation at AFIT in 2003 (Bouska 2003).  This model was used in the UHARS 
demonstration at White Sands in 2011.   
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 To accurately model and account for tropospheric errors several variables are 
considered.  Most of these variables will already be known by any pseudolite once a 
position fix is determined.   Additional measurements are required at each LocataLite 
for atmospheric pressure, air temperature, and relative humidity.  Collecting the same 
additional measurements at the receiver will benefit the user.  Fortunately these data are 
easy to collect on the ground and are already collected at many of the proposed 
pseudolite sites.   
 If not corrected for, tropospheric delay could induce as much as 120m of error 
over 130nmi into each pseudorange measurement.  The model derived in Bouska’s 
thesis has been improved upon in Locata and UHARS work.  Locata networks today 
can reduce residual tropospheric error to about 1% of actual.  A worst case estimate for 
residual tropospheric error is then assumed to be 1 meter or less at 130nmi, or about 4 
parts per million.  The current methods applied to UHARS and Locata are compatible 
with the APNT solution. 
 Multipath error is mitigated in Locata Networks with the addition of a second 
carrier frequency and antenna at each LocataLite.  The two antennas are placed 
approximately 10 meters apart at each UHARS LocataLite.  For the longer ranges 
required by APNT, this separation might be increased.  Each antenna transmits the two 
carrier frequencies, requiring four distinct PRN coded signals at each LocataLite.  In 
the crowded, or indoor environments typical of Locata installations multipath can have 
a significant impact on availability when destructive interference causes receivers to 
lose lock.  Thoughtful installation of pseudolite antennas could offset the need for 
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multiple ranging signals from each pseudolite.  Further research on this topic is 
necessary.   Multipath error can be bounded as a function of code chip duration and 
correlator spacing in the receiver as shown in Equation 5 (Misra and Enge 2001).  This 
is hardly a consolation because a signal with a chipping rate of 10.23MCps like the 
UHARS could see multipath error as large as 45 meters.  
                                                                                                           (5) 
A Proposed Signal and Predicted Performance 
 The sections above describe several variables in the UHARS signal that could 
be modified to meet APNT requirements.  MATLAB was used to efficiently 
manipulate these variables and to determine the effective range and ranging accuracy of 
any proposed pseudolite signal.   Equations 1, 2, 4, and 5 were used to model the signal.  
The CDMA and TDMA patterns of Locata were not significantly changed.  Table 6 
lists the variables used to estimate performance of an APNT signal.  Table 7 lists the 
outputs of the model.   
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Table 6: Proposed Signal Variables 
Variable UHARS Proposed Value 
   10.23 MHz 10.23MHz 
   2241 & 2465 MHz 971.85 MHz 
         10.23 MCps 5.115MCps 
Code Length 1023 1023 
TDMA Slot Duration 100µs 100µs 
Data Bit Rate 100 100 
Transmitted Power 10W 20W 
Transmitter Antenna Gain  2.3dB 
Receiver Antenna Gain  5.162dB 
User Range 15 nmi 130 nmi 
Transmission Mask 20MHz Bandpass 6MHz Bandpass 
N0 – Noise background  -150dBW/Hz 
Maximum PDOP 2.838 2.838 
Max Correlator Spacing  1 
Minimum Received Code 
Power 
~ -135dBW -132dBW 
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Table 7: Estimated Signal Accuracy 
Measure Performance Value 
95% RMS DLL Error 
.74 meters 
Residual Tropospheric Error 2 meters 
Local Timing Synchronization Error 
(Single TimeLoc hop) 
.6 meters 
95% RMS Position Accuracy 
(                     ) 
6.3 meters 
  
The model also included an analysis of received signal by other systems in the 
ARNS band.  Each system has a specified level of interference it’s receivers must be 
able to tolerate.  DME, UAT, and 1030 ATCRBS, and JTIDS each specify 
approximately -130dBW continuous co-channel interference.  Each system also 
specifies a minimum receiver rejection level for out of band interference.  If a 4MHz 
wide band is assumed, the maximum received PSD for any system is -196dBW/Hz.  
The model was run at varying center frequencies, chipping rates, transmitted power 
levels and user ranges to determine the effects on each neighboring system.   The 
values above produced a signal that meets the 92.6m accuracy requirement and appears 
to fit within the ARNS band.  Figure 25 shows the received PSD of a proposed APNT 
signal at three different center frequencies.  The solid line PSD plots represent the 
power arriving at a receiving antenna at 100m from the transmitter.  Interference levels 
drop as the receiver and offending transmitter are separated further.  A band pass filter 
has been applied at the transmitter, but no receiver filtering is accounted for.   A rough 
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estimate of acceptable interference level is the horizontal dashed line at -196dBW/Hz.  
-196dBW/Hz is the PSD of  -130dBW within a 4MHz band.  If the PSD plot of a 
proposed signal is above this line at any given frequency then interference may be a 
problem.  The vertical bars represent each ARNS system channel in use and do not 
imply power or bandwidth occupied.   The dashed lines of 1030 ATCRBS and GPS L5 
illustrate the broadband nature of those signals.  Figures 18 and 25 can be used in 
conjunction to evaluate a more desirable center frequency for pseudolite APNT.  Note 
the proximity of the proposed APNT signal at 971MHz to the UAT transmitter at 
978MHz.  This is an area for further study if 971MHz is chosen.  The UAT signal is 
only modulated at 1Mbps, making it a fairly narrow signal.  The receiver mask applied 
to a UAT transmitter is -20dB down at +/- 1MHz and -5dB down at +/- 2MHz.   UAT 
rejection ratios specified are similar.  Applying the receiver rejection ratio to the model 
of the proposed APNT signal yields only -142dBW of received interference at the UAT 
from a pseudolite 100m away.   
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Figure 22: Co-Channel Interference Threshold 
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Co-Channel Interference Threshhold 
1090 ATCRBS 
UAT 
DME Airborne Interrogation 
DME Ground Reply 
Uncommon DME/TACAN Interrogation 
Uncommon DME/TACAN Reply 
JTIDS 
1030 ATCRBS, 25W, 4MBps, 926m 
GPS L5 
971MHz, 20W, 5.1MCps, 100m 
1156MHz, 20W, 5.1MCps, 100m 
1018 MHz, 20W, 5.11MCps, 100m 
Assuming -130dBW co-channel 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions of Research 
AFIT was tasked by the FAA to answer the question: Could a pseudolite system 
similar to Locata and the UHARS meet APNT requirements by 2025?  The question 
was answered through a systems engineering approach.  A model of the proposed 
signal was built to evaluate its performance and enable modification for analysis of 
alternatives.  Chapter III of this thesis describes the process used to connect NextGen 
OIs to APNT performance requirements and the pillars of APNT described in the 
APNT CONOPS.   This process was indifferent to the technology or design of the 
APNT source chosen.   Instead, it answers the question: Will the performance 
requirements laid out for a future APNT source meet NextGen Operational 
Improvements?  Chapter IV takes a close look at the architecture of Locata and the 
UHARS to determine how UHARS could meet those APNT requirements. 
63 operational improvements related to navigation, positioning, and surveillance 
were matched against APNT performance requirements.  Nearly half of those OIs will 
not be fully enabled by APNT given the performance requirements and scope of APNT 
laid out in the CONOPs.  The OIs that are not met relate to increasing capacity in 
terminal areas, providing access to secondary airports, positioning and surveillance on 
the ground, and flexibility in the terminal environment.  If the threshold for accuracy is 
185 meters, capacity would not be improved in many areas.  Capacity is dependent on 
spacing and spacing is limited by surveillance capability.  To meet or exceed current 
spacing minimums, APNT must support 3nmi separation by providing 92.6m accuracy.  
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An unexpected GPS outage would require significant workload increase on the part of 
controllers and aircrew to reposition aircraft to safe separation distances.  If 92.6 meters 
is achieved, then surveillance performance will meet that of ATCRBS and ADS-B.  A 
seamless transition from GPS to APNT is then possible in the event of GPS outage.   
APNT shortfalls are then the product of lack of coverage and reliance on ILS for 
recovery in low ceilings and visibility.  Limiting APNT Zone 2 to 5000’ AGL will 
restrict access to many secondary airports.  The FAA should consider increasing the 
number of Zone 3 space, or potentially adding a fourth zone that would extend 
guaranteed APNT service to 1000’ AGL over secondary airports.  Locata technology 
has the flexibility to allow for an infinite number of pseudolites within the NAS, given 
no more than 50 are within view of a receiver at any time.  Low powered pseudolites 
could be placed on the ground at busy airports to provide APNT positioning on the 
ground.  I should be noted here that the cost of meeting or exceeding current RNAV 
standards with a APNT system may be prohibitive and unnecessary.  As an alternative 
to GNSS, APNT, at a minimum, must allow safe recovery of aircraft in the event of 
GNSS outage.  The cost benefit analysis may reveal that meeting all of the APNT 
pillars and NextGen OIs is not the prudent choice. 
 The APNT is not being designed as a time distribution service.  TimeLoc is not 
suited to provide time synchronization over long ranges, meaning a UHARS derived 
APNT source would rely on an outside timing synchronization.  Providing robust 
timing to a pseudolite network was explored by Lo, Akos, and Denis in 2012 (Lo, Akos 
and Dennis 2012).   Their work shows that antennas designed to reject interference and 
jamming could provide a reliable link to space based time sources.  This method is 
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possibly affordable enough to provide reliable timing to pseudolites but jam resistant 
antennas may be cost prohibitive for many other users in need of a precision timing 
source.  Given the explosion in creative use of the GPS for both position and time, it 
seems shortsighted to limit APNT design to only servicing well equipped aircraft above 
1000’ AGL. 
 A modified UHARS signal was proposed in Chapter IV that will provide better 
than 92.6m positioning accuracy at ranges up to 130nmi.  With a modest power 
increase to 20W and  a reduction in code chipping rate, the UHARS signal can match 
the service volume of today’s  navigation beacons and provide a position reference 
accurate to better than 10 meters.  This level of accuracy allows for some design 
flexibility.  For example, poor geometry and PDOP or network timing errors would not 
immediately push accuracy out of limits and requirements could be relaxed.  Increasing 
power transmitted is not likely to significantly reduce the number of pseudolites 
required to cover all APNT Zones.  Terrain masking and service at extreme elevation 
angles is more often a limiting factor.   An analysis similar to that conducted by MITRE 
in 2012 could determine the most efficient location of pseudolites to cover all APNT 
Zones. 
The modified UHARS signal could potentially fit into the crowded ARNS band 
provided.  An infrequently used band from 960-977 MHz exists that could fit a well 
masked wide band navigation signal.   The proposed signal is shown to be below the 
allowable interference threshold of its closest neighbor, the UATs used for ADS-B, 
when separated by 100 meters.  The practicality of building transmission sites in the 
real world will have to be studied.   Over 800 ground based UATs are planned 
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throughout the NAS.  Nearly all aircraft equipped for ADS-B will operate a UAT.   
Antenna choices and proximity of transmitters should be evaluated in future work.  Any 
channel chosen within the ARNS will have its list of challenges but 971 MHz appears 
to be the least complicated.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The first priority for future research should be a detailed service volume 
analysis similar to the DME study performed by MITRE in 2012.  The input variables 
and their differences are described in Table 5.  Chapter IV describes a candidate signal 
that could provide a service volume similar to VOR and DME sites.   This signal can 
provide a starting point to determine if pseudolites placed at current VOR and DME 
sites would provide adequate coverage of all APNT Zones. Where significant gaps 
exist, the number and location of new signals required can be determined.  Based on the 
shortfalls of APNT found in this thesis, future research could focus on the expansion of 
APNT Zones to the surface or an increase in the number of Zone 3 cones for 
approaches to secondary airports.  The cost of expanding APNT service in numbers of 
pseudolites is an important factor. 
Related to this task of evaluating pseudolite coverage, would be a systems 
engineering approach to expanding APNT service for non-aviation use.   Positioning, 
and timing uses for GPS far exceed those originally required by the DoD.  Thoughtful, 
flexible design has allowed the commercial benefits of GPS to far exceed its cost.  If 
this approach is taken to APNT it may be applied to highway navigation, mobile 
communication, and time distribution on the ground.  Research would attempt to 
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answer the following questions.  Could a Locata system be implemented on a national 
scale with large numbers of low powered pseudolites with service volumes similar to 
cellular phones?   Could such a pseudolite network provide the integrity required for 
safety-of-life applications? 
The second priority for future research should be a detailed simulation of 
candidate signals.  Three channels for APNT were proposed in this thesis and roughly 
modeled against neighboring ARNS band signals.  An APNT signal centered at 
971MHz must not interfere with the UATs broadcasting at 978MHz, the DME channels 
that begin at 980 MHz, or the JTIDS channels as low as 970MHz.  Broadcasting 
experimental signals in the ARNS band is a complex task.   Simulation of the APNT 
signal as well as the UAT signals for interference analysis may be within the scope of a 
follow-on thesis.   
A high fidelity model of any APNT signal might include pseudolite transmitter 
and receiver design.   Recall that Locata was modeled from the GPS to facilitate 
integrated receiver design.  The FAA will likely require that APNT receivers be 
installed on all aircraft that wish to operate in controlled airspace.  Other users of 
APNT, especially non-aviation and non-commercial user would benefit from small, 
inexpensive receivers.   Given a candidate APNT signal, could a single receiver be 
designed to track both APNT and GNSS signals?  Smart phones, small unmanned 
aircraft, personal watches, and light aircraft would all benefit from compact, 
inexpensive designs.  Which antennas would be well suited to receive a given APNT 
signal?  Addition and certification of antennas on aircraft can be costly.   Future 
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research might explore the possibility of using a single antenna for UAT 
communication at 978MHz and APNT reception at 971MHz. 
  A third area of future research focuses on pseudolite clock synchronization.  As 
discussed in this thesis, TimeLoc via line-of-sight transmissions is not a viable solution.  
Technology exists that could potentially make satellite based time references a robust 
and viable option (Lo, Akos and Dennis, Time Source Options for Alternate 
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) 2012).  LocataLites (and UHARS 
pseudolites) rely on 1Hz updates of a GPS time reference at the Master pseudolite.   
Any error in the Master pseudolite’s reference to true GPS or drift between updates is 
irrelevant to the positioning accuracy of the pseudolite network.  Rather, positioning 
accuracy is dependent on the network’s ability to synchronize clocks via TimeLoc.  
Modification of the LocataLite architecture to accurately synchronize each pseudolite 
independently to GPS or other GNSS should be explored.  Pseudolite clock correction 
to better than 3ns would contribute less than a meter to URE.  Based on signal 
performance estimates in this thesis, that is well within the performance margin 
provided. 
 Integrity is important attributes that should be further studied.  Integrity in the 
GPS is partly inherent in the fact that it is space based, controlled and monitored by the 
DOD.   Primarily, integrity is based on RAIM predictions and measurements.  RAIM 
requires an over determined solution that is easily available from the GPS but would 
require a significant increase in the number of pseudolites installed over the CONUS.  
Methods to replace RAIM as the primary means of integrity checking should be 
researched by the APNT team.   Increasing the data rate of the navigation message may 
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allow for public key encryption.  Monitoring of the ranging signal from each pseudolite 
and broadcasting an integrity flag on a separate channel is also a possibility.   
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Appendix 
A.  PNT Performance Requirements 
 
Precision-based Navigation, ADS-B Surveillance and Timing Performance In Support of Trajectory-based Operations 
Accuracy Containment Separation NACp NIC
Aircraft State
Leader/
Follower Flight Operation (95%) (10-7) (95%) (10-7)
1 Parked
2 Taxi-out Visual Visual Visual 0.05 nm (8)2 0.6 nm (6)2
Low-vis (300-600 RVR) 1m 3m 1,200 feet3 121 m (8) 0.2 nm (7) GNSS GBAS
Low-vis (<300 RVR) 1m 3m 1,200 feet 121 m (8) 0.2 nm (7) GNSS GBAS
3,4 Takeoff Visual Visual Visual 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
High Density Airport Visual Visual Visual 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
Low-vis (300-600 RVR)5 1m 3m 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6) GNSS GBAS
Low-vis (<300 RVR) 1m 3m 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6) GNSS GBAS
5,13 Climb to Cleanup6 0.3 nm 0.6 nm 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
6,13 x Departure/Climb 1 nm 2 nm 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
Top of Climb 0.3 nm 0.6 nm 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
High Density Airspace 0.3 nm 0.6 nm 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
Top of Climb 0.3 nm 0.6 nm 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
Top of Climb (Merge) 0.3 nm 0.6 nm 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
7 x Cruise8 10 nm 20 nm 20 nm 0.1 nm (7) 1 nm (5)
4 nm 8 nm 10 nm 0.1 nm (7) 1 nm (5)
2 nm 4 nm 5 nm <308 m (7) <1 nm (5)
High Density Airspace 1 nm 2 nm 3 nm15 <92.6 m (8) <0.2 nm (7)
8 x Top of Descent 2 nm 4 nm 5 nm <308 m (7) <1 nm (5)
High Density Airspace 1 nm 2 nm 3 nm <92.6 m (8) <0.2 nm (7)
10 x Arrival 1 nm 2 nm 3 nm <308 m (7) <1 nm (5)
High Density Airspace 0.3 nm 0.6 nm 3 nm <92.6 m (8) <0.2 nm (7) GNSS GBAS
11,12 x Approach
Initial Approach Fix
Final Approach Fix
Runway Threshold
High Density Airports
Metering Fix
Initial Approach Fix
Stable Approach Point9
Final Approach Fix
Runway Threshold
14,15 x Single Runway
LNAV 0.3 nm 0.6 nm 3 nm 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6) GNSS SBAS
RNP (AR) 0.3-0.1 nm14 0.3-0.1 nm14 3 nm TBD10 TBD GNSS SBAS
LPV 16m/4m 40m/50m 3 nm TBD TBD GNSS SBAS
LPV-200 16m/4m 40m/35m 3 nm TBD TBD GNSS SBAS
GLS Cat-I 16m/4m 40m/10m 3 nm TBD TBD GNSS GBAS
GLS Cat-III 16m/4m 40m/10m 3 nm TBD TBD GNSS GBAS
High Density Airports
14,15 x Parallel Runways11
> 4,300 feet Separation 0.3 nm 0.6 nm 2 nm IPA12 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6) GNSS SBAS
3,400 - 4,300 feet 16m/4m 40m/10m 2 nm IPA 121 m (8) 0.2 nm (7) GNSS SBAS
2,500 - 3,400 feet 16m/4m 40m/10m 2 nm IPA 121 m (8) 0.2 nm (7) GNSS GBAS
1,600 - 2,500 feet 16m/4m 40m/10m 2.5 nm DPA TBD TBD GNSS GBAS
750 - 1,600 feet 16m/4m 40m/10m 2.5 nm DPA TBD TBD GNSS GBAS
16 Taxi-in Visual Visual Visual 0.05 nm (8) 0.6 nm (6)
Low-vis (300-600 RVR) 1m 3m 1,200 feet 121 m (8) 0.2 nm (7) GNSS GBAS
Low-vis (<300 RVR) 1m 3m 1,200 feet 121 m (8) 0.2 nm (7) GNSS GBAS
Notes: 1. Required Time Performance (RTP) has been created by the JPDO TBO Study Team to represent performance goals until
confirmed by research and represents a range of time values.
2. Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp) and Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) values provided 
Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL) in ( ).
3. Requires research. Assumes 20 nm/hour taxi speed and being able to detect another aircraft/vehicle by ADS-B 
and stopping to avoid collision.
4. In low-vis conditions, capacity is reduced and RTP increases to compensate for slower surface movement.
5. Centerline guidance required for takeoff roll.
Operations <300 RVR are expected to be possible with enhanced vision that produces the equivalent of 300 RVR visibility.
6. Flight segment used to transition from liftoff to start of climb route where gear and flaps are retracted.
7. Increased precision in RTP required to merge into an overhead flow.
8. Includes oceanic and offshore operations.
9. Stable approach point is where the aircraft is fully configured and slowed to appropriate speed and the
pilot is prepared to land. In TBO, this is a point where time changes are not made.
10. Surveillance values dependent on research to mirror ADS-B In requirements for the procedure
11. TBO envisions 2,500 feet lateral runway separation to be an independed arrival stream and any less
runway spacing is a dependent arrival stream between the two runways
12. Independent Parallel Approach (IPA); Dependent Parallel Approach (DPA)
13. Operational requirements are defined for total system accuracy, which is dominated by flight technical error 
and position accuracy for the operation is negligible.
14. Containment for RNP AR is specified as a total system requirement; value is representative of current approvals.
15. Assessment of approval for 3 nm separation for NACp 92.6 m and NIC <0.2 nm not yet completed (August 2011)
Navigation
(>99.0% Availability)
Surveillance
(>99.9% Availability)
Positioning
GNSS PNT
(99.0 - 99.999%)
Time Performance
RTP1
(+/-) 1 minute
(+/-) 1 minute
(+5/-15) minutes
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
(+/-) 3 minutes4
(+/-) 3 minutes
(+/-) 2-5 minutes
GNSS
(+/-) 1 minute
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
GNSS
(+/-) 3 minutes4
(+/-) 3 minutes4
(+/-) 3-4 seconds
(+/-) 3-4 seconds
(+/-) 3-4 seconds
(+1/-5) minutes
(+/-) 1 minute7
(+1/-5) minutes
(+/-) 2-5 minutes
(+/-) 20 seconds
(+/-) 20 seconds
(+/-) 30 seconds
(+5/-15) minutes
(+/-) 1-3 minutes
(+5/-15) minutes
(+/-) 2-5 minutes
(+/-) 3 minutes
(+/-) 3 minutes
(+1/-3) minutes
(+/-) 3 minutes
(+/-) 3 minutes
(+/-) 12-18 seconds
(+/-) 20 seconds
(+/-) 30 seconds
(+/-) 30 seconds
(+/-) 3 minutes
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B. OI Shortfalls Listed 
 
JPDO 
Identifier 
Targeted 
NextGen 
Capability 
For 225 
APNT 
Function 
Impact 
APNT 
Supported? 
APNT Gap 
Performanc
e Zone 
Name Description Benefits 
Solution 
Set 
Service 
310   
Provides 
position 
to GA 
aircraft 
for ADS-
B 
positioni
ng for 
more 
direct 
routing 
through 
busy 
terminal 
area 
airspace 
1 2 
Cost may 
prohibit 
acces to 
GA 
3 
Improved GA 
Access to 
Traverse 
Terminal 
Areas 
This Operational Improvement 
(OI) results in increased access 
to busy airspace, such as Class 
B, for General Aviation (GA) 
operators. More direct routing 
for GA operators is facilitated 
through improved access to 
traverse busy terminal area 
airspace via the continued use 
and possible expansion of 
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) 
Flyways as well as by the 
utilization of Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) 
technologies. Typically, GA 
operators have to fly "around" 
busy airspace, with associated 
penalties in efficiency. With 
this OI a GA flight is more likely 
to transit through busy 
airspace when the desired 
flight path crosses that 
airspace. Major benefits are 
access and efficiency. This OI 
primarily affects 
arrival/departure airspace and 
En Route airspace. 
Roles/Responsibilities: Based 
on the initial planned solution 
(static corridors), there are no 
changes in 
roles/responsibilities. 
Increased 
efficiency 
Increased 
accessibility 
Enhanced 
user-preferred 
trajectories 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
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311   
Provides 
position 
to 
continue 
RNAV 
and RNP 
to 
continue 
more 
efficient 
aircraft 
trajector
ies for 
repeatab
le and 
predicta
ble 
navigati
on 1 2 d 1,3 
Increase 
Capacity and 
Efficiency 
Using Area 
Navigation 
(RNAV) and 
Required 
Navigation 
Performance 
(RNP) 
Both RNAV and RNP will 
enable more efficient aircraft 
trajectories. RNAV and RNP 
combined with airspace 
changes, increase airspace 
efficiency and capacity. 
RNAV and RNP will permit the 
flexibility of point-to-point 
operations and allow for the 
development of routes, 
procedures, and approaches 
that are more efficient and 
free from the constraints and 
inefficiencies of the ground-
based NAVAIDS. This capability 
can also be combined with an 
Instrument Landing System 
(ILS), to improve the transition 
onto an ILS final approach and 
to provide a guided missed 
approach. Consequently, RNAV 
and RNP will enable safe and 
efficient procedures and 
airspace that address the 
complexities of the terminal 
operation through repeatable 
and predictable navigation. 
These will include the ability to 
implement curved path 
procedures that can address 
terrain, and noise-sensitive 
and/or special-use airspace. 
Terminal and en route 
procedures will be designed 
for more efficient spacing and 
will address complex 
operations. 
* Improved 
efficiency 
Initiate 
Trajectory 
Based 
Operation
s 
Airspace 
Manageme
nt 
108 
317   
Will 
provide 
position 
to 
enable 
navigati
on to 
navigate 
to ILS 
final 
approac
h course 
and 
missed 
approac
h 
procedu
res 
2 2 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to 
maintain 
2025 
capacity 
in 
Terminal 
Environm
ent, ILS 
required 
3 
Low 
Visibility/Ceili
ng Approach 
Operations 
The ability to complete 
approaches in low 
visibility/ceiling conditions is 
improved for aircraft equipped 
with some combination of 
navigation derived from 
augmented GNSS or ILS and 
other  cockpit-based 
technologies or combinations 
of cockpit-based technologies 
and ground infrastructure. 
 
The ability to complete 
approaches in low 
visibility/ceiling conditions is 
improved for aircraft equipped 
with some combination of 
navigation derived from 
augmented GNSS or ILS and 
Head-up Display (HUD), EFVS, 
SVS, advanced vision system 
and other cockpit-based 
technologies that combine to 
improve human 
performance.  Cockpit-based 
technologies allow instrument 
approach procedure access 
with reduced requirements on 
ground-based navigation and 
airport infrastructure.  Due to 
onboard avionics airport 
access is maintained in low 
visibility/ceiling conditions. 
To Be 
Determined 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
Navigation 
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327 x 
Provides 
position 
informat
ion for 
ADS-B in 
real time 
for 
surveilla
nce and 
automati
on. 
2 1 
Not 
provided 
on surface 
S 
Full Surface 
Traffic 
Management 
with 
Conformance 
Monitoring 
Operational Improvement Increased 
airport 
efficiency 
Enhanced 
surface safety 
Improved 
shared 
situational 
awareness 
Decreased 
emissions and 
airport noise 
levels 
Increase 
Arrivals/D
epartures 
at High 
Density 
Airports 
TM-
Synchroniza
tion 
330   
Provide 
position 
to 
ground 
based 
automati
on to 
provide 
conflict 
free 
time 
based 
metering 
solutions 
1 1 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to 
maintain 
2025 
capacity 
in 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
3, S 
Time-Based 
Metering in 
the Terminal 
Environment 
Aircraft are time-based 
metered inside the terminal 
environment, enhancing 
efficiency through the optimal 
use of terminal airspace and 
surface capacity.  ANSP 
automation develops 
trajectories and allocates time-
based slots for various points 
(as needed) within the 
terminal environment, 
applying RNAV route data and 
leveraging enhanced 
surveillance, data 
communications, and closely 
spaced parallel, converging, 
and intersecting runway 
capabilities (where applicable). 
 
This OI extends current 
metering capabilities into the 
terminal environment and 
furthers the pursuit of end-to-
end metering and trajectory-
based operations.  It also 
supports capabilities designed 
to expand the use of terminal 
separation standards in 
transition airspace.  
Increased 
Efficiency 
Increased 
Capacity 
Increase 
Arrivals/D
epartures 
at High 
Density 
Airports 
TM-
Synchroniza
tion 
110 
331 x 
Provides 
position 
to 
update 
Metropl
ex 
scheduli
ng 
automati
on to 
optimize 
runway 
and 
surface 
moveme
nt 
2 2 
Not 
provided 
on surface 
3, S 
Improved 
Management 
of 
Arrival/Surfac
e/Departure 
Flow 
Operations 
This Operational Improvement 
(OI) integrates advanced 
Arrival/Departure flow 
management with advanced 
Surface operation functions to 
improve overall airport 
capacity and efficiency. Air 
Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) automation uses arrival 
and departure-scheduling 
tools and four dimensional 
trajectory (4DT) agreements to 
flow traffic at high-density 
airports 
Improved 
efficiency 
Reduced fuel 
burn, airport 
noise, and 
emissions 
Increase 
Arrivals/D
epartures 
at High 
Density 
Airports 
TM-
Synchroniza
tion 
334   
Provides 
position 
to 
equippe
d aircraft 
onboard 
displays 
and 
alerting 
systems 
for 
indepen
dent 
convergi
ng 
runways 
to 
continue 
VMC 
departur
e and 
arrival 
rates 
2 2 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to 
maintain 
2025 
capacity 
in 
Terminal 
Environm
ent if ILS 
is 
required 
3 
Independent 
Converging 
Approaches in 
IMC 
This Operational Improvement 
(OI) enables maintaining Visual 
Meteorological Condition 
(VMC) arrival and departure 
rates in Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC) through use of onboard 
displays and alerting for 
independent converging 
runways. Using precision 
navigation, cooperative 
surveillance, and onboard 
algorithms and displays allows 
the reduction of lateral 
separation requirements for 
converging runway operations 
in IMC. Includes independent 
approaches to converging 
runways that are centerline 
distances greater than 2500 ft. 
The implementation of this OI 
is strongly dependent on when 
an airline decides this is 
important and steps forward 
to advocate for it. 
0 Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
111 
340 x 
Provides 
position 
to ADS-B 
for self 
separati
on.  
Accuracy 
and 
timeline
ss is 
improve
d over 
tradition
al 
surface 
MLAT. 
2 1 
Not 
provided 
on surface 
S 
Provide 
Surface 
Situation to 
Pilots, Service 
Providers and 
Vehicle 
Operators for 
Near-Zero-
Visibility 
Surface 
Operations 
Aircraft and surface vehicle 
positions are displayed to 
aircraft, vehicle operators, and 
air navigation service providers 
(ANSP) to provide situational 
awareness in restricted 
visibility conditions, increasing 
efficiency of surface 
movement. Surface movement 
is guided by technology such 
as moving map displays, 
enhanced vision sensors, 
synthetic vision systems, 
Ground Support Equipment 
and a Cooperative Surveillance 
System. Aircraft and surface 
vehicle position will be sensed 
and communicated utilizing 
systems such as Cockpit 
Display of Traffic Information 
(CDTI) and Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) 
Improved 
situational 
awarenessEnh
anced 
safetyEnhance
d efficiency 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
341 x 
Provides 
position 
to ADS-B 
for self 
separati
on.  
Accuracy 
and 
timeline
ss is 
improve
d over 
tradition
al 
surface 
MLAT. 
2 1 
Not 
provided 
on surface 
S 
Limited 
Simultaneous 
Runway 
Occupancy 
Runway capacity is increased 
through the allowance of more 
than one aircraft on the 
runway, at a given time, for 
specific situations.  
 
The expected use is to relax 
some of the present 
procedures/rules, thereby 
allowing an aircraft to land 
while another aircraft is in the 
process of exiting the runway 
onto a taxiway, or allowing an 
aircraft to enter the runway 
while another aircraft is in the 
process of departing from that 
runway. 
Increased 
capacity 
Increase 
Arrivals/D
epartures 
at High 
Density 
Airports 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
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348 x 
Provides 
required 
perform
ance 
criteria 
for less 
than  3 
mile 
separati
on 
standard
s in 
dense 
terminal 
areas 
1 1 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to support 
<3 nm 
separatio
n 
3 
Reduce 
Separation - 
High Density 
Terminal Less 
Than 3-miles 
Metroplex airspace capacity is 
increased through 
implementing separation 
procedures for conducting 
separation with less than 3-
miles between arrival and 
departure routes in a high 
density environment.  
 
This Operational Improvement 
increases metroplex airspace 
capacity and supports super 
density airport operations. 
Enhanced surveillance and 
data processing provides faster 
update rates to allow reduced 
separation.  
Increased 
capacity 
Increase 
Arrivals/D
epartures 
at High 
Density 
Airports 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
359 x 
Provides 
position 
to ADS-B 
for self 
separati
on 
1 1 
Solution 
alternativ
es do not 
support 
Oceanic 
service 
1 
Self-
Separation 
Airspace - 
Oceanic 
Oceanic user efficiency and Air 
Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) productivity are 
improved through self-
separation operations in 
designated oceanic airspace 
for capable aircraft.  
 
 
Increased 
efficiency 
Initiate 
Trajectory 
Based 
Operation
s 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
363 x 
Provides 
position 
for 
equippe
d aircraft 
for 
merging, 
passing 
or 
crossing 
of other 
traffic. 
Provides 
1 2 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to 
maintain 
2025 
capacity 
in 
Terminal 
Environm
ent if ILS 
is 
required 
1,3 
Delegated 
Separation - 
Complex 
Procedures 
In Air Navigation Service 
Provider (ANSP)-managed 
airspace, the ANSP delegates 
separation responsibilities to 
capable aircraft to improve 
operator routing, enhance 
operational efficiency, or 
increase ANSP productivity.  
 
Increased 
efficiency 
Increase 
Arrivals/D
epartures 
at High 
Density 
Airports 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
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position 
for 
conflict 
detectio
n and 
alerting 
383   
Provides 
position 
to ADS-
B.  
Accuracy 
and 
timeline
ss is 
improve
d over 
tradition
al 
surface 
MLAT. 
1 1 
Not 
provided 
on surface 
3, S 
Improved 
Runway 
Safety 
Situational 
Awareness for 
Controllers 
At large airports, current 
controller tools provide 
surface displays and can alert 
controllers when aircraft taxi 
into areas where a runway 
incursion could 
result.  Additional ground-
based capabilities will be 
developed to improve runway 
safety that include expansion 
of runway surveillance 
technology (i.e., ASDE-X) to 
additional airports, 
deployment of low cost 
surveillance for medium-sized 
airports , improved runway 
markings, and initial  controller 
taxi conformance monitoring 
capabilities.  These ground-
based tools will provide a 
range of capabilities to help 
improve runway safety for 
medium- to large-sized 
airports. 
*Increased 
safety 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
ATC-
Advisory 
114 
384 x 
Provides 
position 
to ADS-B 
for self 
separati
on.  
Accuracy 
and 
timeline
ss is 
improve
d over 
tradition
al 
surface 
MLAT. 
2 1 
Not 
provided 
on surface 
3,S 
Improve 
Runway 
Safety 
Situational 
Awareness for 
Pilots 
Runway safety operations are 
improved by providing pilots 
with improved awareness of 
their location on the airport 
surface as well as runway 
incursion alerting 
capabilities.  To help minimize 
pilot disorientation on the 
airport surface, a surface 
moving map display with 
ownship position will be 
available.     Both ground-
based (e.g., RWSL) and 
cockpit-based runway 
incursion alerting capabilities 
will also be available to alert 
pilots when it's unsafe to enter 
the runway.   
*Increased 
safety 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
ATC-
Advisory 
386   
Provides 
position 
in 
mountai
nous 
areas 
where 
radar 
coverage 
is limited 
for both 
navigati
on and 
surveilla
nce 
1 2 
APNT 
CONOPs 
only 
supports 
135 
busiest 
airports, 
RADAR 
like 
coverage 
not 
available 
below 
5000'AGL 
3 
Expanded 
Radar-like 
Services to 
Secondary 
Airports 
Expanded capacity is available 
in Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (IMC) at additional 
secondary airports. Expanded 
delivery of radar-like coverage 
with surveillance alternatives 
such as Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) 
coverage, combined with 
other radar sources, and with 
an expansion of 
communication coverage 
provides equipped aircraft 
with radar-like services to 
secondary airports.  
 
Equipped aircraft 
automatically receive airborne 
broadcast traffic information. 
Surface traffic information is 
also available at select non-
towered satellite airports.  
     
Enhanced surveillance 
Improved 
safety 
Expanded 
ANSP services 
Enhanced 
surveillance 
coverage  
Enhanced 
search and 
rescue 
coordination 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
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coverage in areas of 
mountainous terrain where 
radar coverage is limited, 
especially to small airports, 
enables ANSP to provide radar-
like services to equipped 
aircraft. This capability 
enhances alerting and 
emergency services beyond 
normal radar coverage areas. 
388   
Provides 
position 
for a 
transitio
n from 
localizer 
guidance 
to climb 
navigati
on for 
turning 
procedu
res 
(SIDS) 
2 1 
Not 
provided 
on surface 
3, S 
Low 
Visibility/Ceili
ng Takeoff 
Operations 
Leverages some combination 
of HUD, EFVS, SVS, or 
advanced vision system 
capabilities to allow 
appropriately equipped 
aircraft to takeoff in low 
visibility conditions.  Due to 
onboard avionics the aircraft 
will be less dependent on 
ground based infrastructure at 
the airport while conducting 
take-off operations. 
 
Currently, visibility minimums 
for takeoff are dependent on 
aircraft equipment, ground 
infrastructure, and runway 
marking and lighting.  This 
ensures that pilots are able to 
visually maintain the runway 
centerline during both nominal 
and aborted takeoffs.  By using 
cockpit-based technologies 
such as HUD, EFVS, SVS or 
other advanced vision system 
technologies,  the pilot will be 
able to maintain an equivalent 
awareness of runway 
centerline with reduced 
dependence on airport 
*Increased 
Access 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
Navigation 
116 
infrastructure when visual 
conditions are below those 
normally required for takeoff. 
389   
Provides 
course 
and 
altitude 
guidance 
to 
touchdo
wn as 
well as 
runway 
situation
al 
awarene
ss 
2 2 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to 
maintain 
2025 
capacity 
in 
Terminal 
Environm
ent.  Not 
supported 
if ILS is 
not 
available. 
3, S 
Low 
Visibility/Ceili
ng Landing 
Operations 
The ability to land in low 
visibility/ceiling conditions is 
improved for aircraft equipped 
with some combination of 
navigation derived from 
augmented GNSS or ILS and 
other  cockpit-based 
technologies or combinations 
of cockpit-based technologies 
and ground infrastructure.The 
ability to land in low 
visibility/ceiling conditions is 
improved for aircraft equipped 
with some combination of 
navigation derived from 
augmented GNSS or ILS, and 
Head-up Display (HUD), EFVS, 
SVS, advanced vision system 
and other cockpit-based 
technologies that combine to 
improve human 
performance.  Cockpit-based 
technologies allow instrument 
approach procedure access 
with reduced requirements on 
ground-based navigation and 
airport infrastructure.  Due to 
onboard avionics airport 
access is maintained in low 
visibility/ceiling conditions. 
*Increased 
Safety*Increas
ed Access 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
Navigation 
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390   
Provides 
position 
for 
RNP/RN
AV SIDS 
to 
enable 
aircraft 
to avoid 
hazards. 
2 2 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to 
maintain 
2025 
capacity 
in 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
3 
Low 
Visibility/Ceili
ng Departure 
Operations 
Leverages augmented GNSS 
capabilities to allow 
appropriately equipped 
aircraft to depart in low 
visibility conditions.  Due to 
onboard avionics the aircraft 
will be able to depart in low 
visibility conditions using 
RNAV/RNP SIDs, EFVS, SVS, or 
advanced vision systems. 
 
*Increased 
access 
*Enhanced 
Safety 
Increase 
Flexibility 
in the 
Terminal 
Environm
ent 
Navigation 
409 x 
Provides 
postion 
to ADS-B 
for use 
at 
airports 
without 
ground 
based 
surveilan
ce 
2 2 
APNT 
CONOPs 
only 
supports 
135 
busiest 
airports, 
RADAR 
like 
coverage 
not 
available 
below 
5000'AGL 
3, S 
Remotely 
Staffed Tower 
Services 
Remotely Staffed Towers 
provide ATM services for 
operations into and out of 
designated airports without 
physically constructing, 
equipping, and/or sustaining 
tower facilities at these 
airports. Instead of out-the-
window visual surveillance, 
controllers maintain 
situational awareness provided 
by surface surveillance 
displayed on an ANSP display 
system and a suite of decision 
support tools using aircraft-
derived data.  
 
 
*Increased 
airport 
capacity in 
low visibility 
and night 
conditions 
*Improvemen
t in runway 
incursion 
alerting 
*Improvemen
t in availability 
and 
performance 
of ATM 
services at 
airports 
*Reduced cost 
of sustaining, 
expanding, 
and improving 
ATM services 
at airports 
Transform 
Facilities 
Infrastructu
re-
Information 
Manageme
nt Service 
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6005   
Provides 
navigati
on 
capabilit
y to 
remain 
on 
planned 
optimize
d route 
to 
reduce 
emission
s, fuel 
burn and 
noise 
2 2 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to 
maintain 
2025 
capacity 
in 
Terminal 
Environm
ent.  
Negated if 
ILS is not 
optimal 
approach. 
All 
Environmenta
lly & Energy 
Favorable Air 
Traffic 
Management 
Concepts and 
Gate-to-Gate 
Operational 
Procedures - 
Phase II 
Explore, develop, 
demonstrate, evaluate and 
support the implementation 
and deployment of Air Traffic 
Management and gate-to-gate 
operational changes to the 
NAS that have the potential to 
reduce the environmental 
impacts of aviation support 
mobility growth by increasing 
the capacity and throughput of 
the NAS. It will include 
multiple increments delivered 
over time. 
No Benefits 
Provided 
Increase 
Safety, 
Security, 
and 
Environm
ental 
Performa
nce 
Infrastructu
re-
Information 
Manageme
nt Service 
6022   
Provides 
navigati
on 
capabilit
y to 
remain 
on 
planned 
optimize
d route 
to 
reduce 
emission
s, fuel 
burn and 
noise 
2 2 
RNP .3 
not 
sufficient 
to 
maintain 
2025 
capacity 
in 
Terminal 
Environm
ent.  
Negated if 
ILS is not 
optimal 
approach. 
All 
Environmenta
lly & Energy 
Favorable Air 
Traffic 
Management 
Concepts and 
Gate-to-Gate 
Operational 
Procedures - 
Phase III 
Explore, develop, 
demonstrate, evaluate and 
support the implementation 
and deployment of Air Traffic 
Management and gate-to-gate 
operational changes to the 
NAS that have the potential to 
reduce the environmental 
impacts of aviation support 
mobility growth by increasing 
the capacity and throughput of 
the NAS. It will include 
multiple increments delivered 
over time. 
No Benefit 
Provided 
Increase 
Safety, 
Security, 
and 
Environm
ental 
Performa
nce 
Infrastructu
re-
Information 
Manageme
nt Service 
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Provides 
postion 
to ADS-B 
for 
separati
on as 
well as 
continuo
us 
updates 
to INS 
and 
other 
navigati
on 
2 1 
Solution 
alternativ
es do not 
support 
Oceanic 
service 
1 
Oceanic In-
trail Climb and 
Descent 
ANSP automation 
enhancements will take 
advantage of improved 
communication, navigation, 
and surveillance coverage in 
the oceanic domain. When 
authorized by the controller, 
pilots of equipped aircraft use 
established procedures for 
climbs and descents.  
Improved ANSP automation 
provides the opportunity to 
use new procedures and 
reduce longitudinal spacing for 
the duration of the procedure. 
Aircraft are able to fly the 
most advantageous 
trajectories with climb and 
descent maneuvers. 
Improved 
efficiency 
Increased 
capacity 
Reduced fuel 
burn and 
engine 
emissions 
Initiate 
Trajectory 
Based 
Operation
s 
ATC-
Separation 
Assurance 
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C. Glossary of Acronyms 
3D RMS: Three Dimensional Root Mean Squared 
4DT:   Four Dimensional Trajectory 
ADS-B:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
ADS-R:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Re-broadcast 
AGL:   Above Ground Level 
ANSP:  Air Navigation Service Provider 
APNT:   Alternate Precision Navigation and Timing 
ARNS:   Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service 
ATC:   Air Traffic Control 
ATCRBS:  Air TrafficControl RADAR Broadcast Service 
CDMA:  Code Division Multiple Access 
CFR:   Code of Federal Regulations 
CONOPS:  Concept of Operations  
CONUS:  Continental United States 
CPFSK:  Continuous Phase, Frequency Shift Keying 
DLL:   Delay Lock Loop 
DME:   Distance Measuring Equipment 
DOP:   Dilution of Precision 
DS-BPSK:  Direct Sequence – Bi-phase Shift Keying 
FAA:   Federal Aviation Administration 
FCC:   Federal Communications Commission 
FIS-B:  Flight Information Service - Broadcast 
GBT:   Ground Based Transmitter 
GNSS:  Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS:   Global Positioning System 
HPE:  Horizontal Position Error 
ICAO:   International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICD:   Interface Control Document 
IFR:   Instrument Flight Rules 
ILS:   Instrument Landing System 
IMC:   Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
JPDO:  Joint Planning Development Office 
JTIDS:  Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
MLAT: Multi-Lateration 
MSO:   Message Start Opportunity 
NAC:   Navigational Accuracy Code 
NACp:  Navigational Accuracy Code for Position 
NAS:   National Airspace 
Next Gen:  Next Generation Airspace 
OI:   Operational Improvement 
OV:   Operational View 
PDOP:  Positional Dilution of Precision 
121 
PRN:   Pseudo Random Noise 
RAIM:  Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
RNAV:  Area Navigation 
RNP:   Required Navigation Performance 
SA:   Situational Awareness 
SSA:   Shared Situational Awareness 
SV:   System View 
TACAN:  Tactical Aerial Navigation 
TBO:   Trajectory Based Operations 
TDMA:  Time Division Multiple Access 
TIS-B:  Traffic Information Service - Broadcast 
UAT:   Universal Access Transceiver 
UHARS:  Ultra High Accuracy Reference System 
URE:   User Range Error 
VOR:   VHF Omnidirectional Ranging 
VOR MON:  VOR Minimum Operating Network 
WAAS:  Wide Area Augmentation System 
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